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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.
Plaintiff, Counterclaim
Defendant, and Appellee

Case No. 960590-CA

vs.
EVAN O. ROLLER,
Defendant, Counterclaimant,
and Appellant.

(Priority No. 10)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT EVAN O. ROLLER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(j), the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to
the Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court had previously considered and accepted

Appellant's Petition for Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order in Case No. 930-019,
First District Court for Cache County, Utah. The Supreme Court received the Docketing
Statement. The Supreme Court case number is 960162.

2

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court err in summarily holding Roller could not prevail on

malpractice issues?
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law. This Court need not defer to the ruling
of the lower Court, but should review it for correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County,
827 P.2d 212, 217-218 (Utah 1992). Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 56(c). In reviewing Summary Judgment, the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are to be reviewed in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah
1992); Winepar v. Froei Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991).
2.

Was it an abuse of discretion to grant Partial Summary Judgment dismissing

a malpractice Counterclaim because Defendant did not have an expert before discovery was
completed?
Standard_pf Review: Rule 37, U.R.C. Procedure contemplates dismissal of a
claim only after a discovery order is refused. Much later chances to get the expert were
allowed in Hoopilaina v. IHC 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). Where reasonable
minds could differ on whether Defendant's conduct met the required standard, a genuine
issue of fact exists. Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Expert testimony
is not necessarily always required in legal malpractice cases. Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780
P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah App. 1989).

The elements of legal malpractice need only be

supported by some competent evidence to avoid Summary Judgment. Harline v. Barker, 854
P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993).

3

3.

May a former client, Roller, testify Plaintiff breached its duty of care

respecting billings, conflicts, disclosures, discovery, factual arguments, or other matters
within the client's experience?
Standard of Review: Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980),
applied this principle in the medical malpractice context and held that expert testimony is
unnecessary to establish the duty of care where the propriety of treatment is within the
common knowledge and experience of the layman. This is consistent in legal malpractice
cases, Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n 8 (Utah App. 1989), Jackson v.
Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982), Harline v. Barker, 854 P. 2d 595 (Utah App. 1993),
as well as Brown v. Small 825 P. 2d 1209 (Mont. 1992) and Wilkinson v. Rives. 116 Cal.
App. 3d 641, 647 (Cal.Ct.App. 1981), and Rule 701, Utah R. Evidence (lay opinions).
4.

May Defendant's expert Jeffrey W. Appel testify about the duty of care

Plaintiff owed (1) to distinguish between appropriated and deeded water rights; (2) to
defend against a fee title taking in the Cornish condemnation action; (3) to prepare
complete findings for the Court; and (4) to perform the additional items as referred to in
Mr. Appel's Affidavit dated December 14, 1995, R 586-594?
Standard of Review: Utah Rules of Evidence, 702 and 703, opinion testimony
by experts. The same standard as applies for review of Summary Judgment applies to the
alleged "late" availability of Mr. Appel's testimony. The sanctions imposed by Rule 37, U.R.
Civ. Pro. do not suggest dismissal until there is disobedience to an Order to Compel.
Opportunities to get an expert much closer to the trial date were allowed in Hoopilaina v.
IHC, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987).

4

5.

Whether the evidence, plus all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from that

evidence interpreted most favorably to Defendant who opposed Summary Judgment, is
sufficient for Roller to prevail in his malpractice counterclaim?
Standard of Review: The same standards stated for issues No. 1, 2, 3, and 4
apply to this issue. In legal malpractice cases, it is summarized in Jackson v. Dabney, 645
P. 2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982).
6.

Should the Trial Court grant Partial Summary Judgment to Defendant Roller

on the accounting issues?
Standard cf Review: This is an issue of law to be decided after the facts
established by affidavit are reviewed. This Court need not defer to the ruling of the lower
Court, but should review it for correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212,
217, 218 (Utah 1992). Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c).

In reviewing Summary Judgment, the facts and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are to be reviewed in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah 1992).
7.

Should the Court of Appeals grant Roller attorney fees for the Interlocutory

Appeal?
Standard of Review: Utah Code §78-27-56 allows attorney fees in civil actions to the
prevailing party. If the Court determines Plaintiff asserted its claim or its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment without good faith, or that the Trial Court's decision was clearly
erroneous, Koller could be awarded attorney fees on appeal. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202

5

(Ut.Ct.App. 1991). All these issues were preserved for appeal by the Trial Court's Rule
54(b) Certification and the Supreme Court's acceptance of an Interlocutory Appeal.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
These questions of law should be considered in the context of Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
U.R.C.P. 56(c), the relevant part of which reads:
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service
of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. (Emphasis added.)
Because all facts and all factual inferences are to be reviewed in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party, Roller is entitled to testify from his own experience about Plaintiffs
failure to meet obvious duties of care. Hoopilaina, Jackson, Wvcalis, Harline, Brown,

6

Wilkinson, supra. Koller may also use Jeffrey W. Appel as an expert, even though Mr.
Appel was available later than October 29, 1995 and he had only reached preliminary
opinions. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991), Hoopilaina. Jackson.
Wycalis, Harline, Brown, Wilkinson and cases cited in the Standard for Review for Issues
No. 2 and 3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is an interlocutory appeal from a Summary Judgment ruling against Defendant.
At the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment held August 29, 1995,
R 807-829, the Trial Court Judge said he had not read the affidavits and supporting
documentation, R 808, but nevertheless concluded Defendant would have to have an expert
to establish the duty of care breached by Plaintiff, and allowed Defendant 60 days to obtain
an expert and have that expert available to be deposed, R 826. When Plaintiffs counsel
prepared the order, he admitted1, R 375, he was "including" (read "adding") to the Court's
Order that Defendant's expert be "fully" prepared with "final" opinions. March 18, 1996,
Judge Ben H. Hadfield of the First District Court finally denied Defendant's Motion for a
New Trial, and granted Defendant's Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification, R 683.

Mr. Hanni's letter of August 31,1995 prefaces the proposed pleading in these
words, "Although the Court did not specifically say that Defendant's expert
witness or witnesses should be fully prepared and ready to express final
opinions. . ." (Emphasis added.)
7

Defendant's Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order was served2 March
21, 1996. June 19, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court (Case 960162) held the Interlocutory
Order was a final Order for purposes of appeal.
Prior to the Court's March 18,1996 Order Granting Rule 54(b) Certification, Koller
had objected to the language and form of the Partial Summary Judgment. Koller moved
for a hearing, R 412, because Plaintiffs form extended the bench ruling and required
Defendant to have an expert "fully prepared to express final opinions" with respect to the
legal malpractice claims on or before October 28,1995, which was within 60 days of August
29, 1995. Defendant recognized final opinions' full preparation would take longer than
preliminary preparation. Koller also wanted the order to read that expert testimony "may",
rather than "will" be required.
Because he could not, after all, meet the Court's deadline, on October 24, 1995,
Koller moved to extend the time to obtain an expert. Defendant reminded the Court that
before August 29, 1995, it had not imposed a discovery cutoff date, that discovery was not
completed, there had been no pre-trial conference and no pre-trial order was entered. After
August 29, 1995, Koller pointed out that Defendant and Plaintiff had each provided
additional memoranda and affidavits for Partial Summary Judgment on the accounting
issues, plus numerous pleadings concerning the Court's August 29, 1995 ruling. All this,
together with Roller's farming and spending several days meeting in Salt Lake City with

The Petition for Permission to Appeal was filed with the Utah Supreme
Court. It is Case No. 960162. The effect of the March 18, 1996 Order was to
enter the Partial Summary Judgment dated September 25, 1995.
8

proposed experts, and making progress, combined to justify extra time to obtain an expert.
Defendant's motion was denied November 22 1995, R 563-576.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below.
The Court entered Partial Summary Judgment September 25, 1995. Defendant had
until October 28, 1995 to designate an expert witness who, beyond the Court's statement of
August 29, 1995, would be "fully" prepared to express "final" opinions with respect to the
legal malpractice claims. Besides meetings with possible experts, Defendant helped prepare
many pleadings, and tried to keep up with his farm, R 505-507. In December, one expert,
Jeffrey W. Appel, was able to prepare preliminary opinions. The Affidavit of Attorney
Jeffrey W. Appel, R 577-585, R 586-594, was first filed December 14, 1995. The Court's
Memorandum Decision of November 22,1995 had denied Defendant a time extension after
October 28, 1995, but Defendant filed a Motion and also a Memorandum for new trial, R
567-594, on December 14, 1995, within 10 days of when the Order was served.3
The Court issued Memorandum Decisions February 5, 1996 and February 21, 1996.
The first denied the Motion for a New Trial. The second found there were material
disputes about accounting facts. Both parties' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on
the accounting issues were denied. The Court's Order of March 19, 1996 formally denied
Roller's Motion for a New Trial, and granted Roller's Rule 54(b) Certification4.

The Order, R 626-627, was served December 12, 1995, but not signed until
January 9, 1996.
The Motion for 54(b) Certification is at R 628-633, and was served January
11, 1996.
9

C. Summary.
Roller's Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order was served
March 21, 1996. June 19, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court in Case No. 960162, entered its
Order finding the Trial Court's decision to grant Partial Summary Judgment was certifiable
under Rule 54(b), Utah R.Civ.Pro. In Case No. 960162, the Supreme Court stated Roller's
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal should be treated as a Notice of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Parties.

Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant, and Appellee Preston and Chambers, P.C. is a
lawfirm located in Logan, Cache County, Utah. Legal services provided from Plaintiff to
the Defendant were mostly provided by George W. Preston, a member of that firm.
Defendant, Counterclaimant, and Appellant Evan O. Koller is an individual living in
Cornish, Cache County, Utah. Evan O. Koller operates a large grain farm where he lives.
The original Complaint against Evan O. Koller and his wife Marlene B. Koller was filed
May 14, 1992. Marlene Koller died August 27, 1992, before the Defendant was served
October 21, 1992.
2.

Background.
Plaintiff represented the Defendant for approximately 15 years in various legal

matters, much of which was for litigation with Cornish Town concerning access to water.
The Complaint alleges their agreement for legal services ended July 20, 1988, R 2.
Defendant admits this, R 7. On October 3, 1989, Koller and Preston met to discuss
Preston's bill. Koller and Preston did not agree on the balance due, but they settled on an

10

amount. Koller paid the amount agreed on. Transcript, Deposition of Evan O. Koller, May
10, 1993 (hereafter TR') pp 7-8. They left two matters open. Koller subsequently paid
Preston & Chambers for work on the matters left open. Soon after their October 1989
meeting, Preston redid the billings in several accounts, and sent Koller billings which had
been changed for additional amounts. Koller refused to pay the additional amounts reflected
on the billings which had been changed. TR 11, 13, 35. Transcript page numbers are used
because the transcript was not indexed. See P. 21,
Correspondence5 from Koller to Preston confirms Koller was not pleased with some
of Plaintiffs work. Koller promised a malpractice counterclaim, R 189, if Preston chose to
sue for additional amounts. Notwithstanding Plaintiff was paid more than $90,000 for work
over the previous years, Plaintiff sued Defendant for $5,732.43, plus interest, it claimed was
due on the "water rights" account, R 3. Koller counterclaimed, R 10-12, as he had
promised, R 189-193.
3.

Finding a I^gal Malpractice Expert.

August 29, 1995 the District Court gave the Defendant 60 days to find an expert
witness and make the expert available to be deposed, R 820. Plaintiff added to this ruling
that the expert had to be: "fully" prepared to express "final" opinions with respect to the
legal malpractice claims, R 440, 375. Koller did not meet that timetable, notwithstanding

Three detailed letters written September 23, 1990, June 7, 1991, and August
13, 1991 appear in the Record at pages 187 to 197. These were attached as
Exhibit D to Roller's 18 August 1995 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing Claim for Attorney Fees
and In Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Counterclaim, R 162-199.
11

reasonable and diligent efforts, R 505-507. Jeffrey W. Appel's preliminary expert opinions
were presented by Affidavit December 14, 1995, R 577-594. Koller alleged Koller could
testify about the duty of care missed by the Plaintiff for some of the malpractice issues,
because Plaintiff's failure to meet the duty of care was sufficiently obvious that expert
testimony should not be required, R 573-575, 200-231, 232-297, 298-345, 481-496. The
Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel, presenting preliminary opinions, also showed several ways
Plaintiff had probably failed in its duty of care to Koller, R 586-594.
The Court began its hearing August 29, 1995 with the Judge's apology he had only
looked at the file "this morning" for the first time, and had not reviewed all the memoranda
and affidavits in "possibly 200 pages there", R 808.6 Judge Ben H. Hadfield did not choose
to become familiar with the facts. He promised he would not get familiar with them, R 827,
Lines 1-6! Without reading Roller's Affidavits, sworn answers to Interrogatories and other
documents, he concluded Roller's malpractice claims must be supported by an expert R 825827. At the same time, the Judge admitted some claims may not require expert testimony,
but the Judge chose not to sort out which ones did, and did not, require an expert, R 827.
Because Plaintiffs Counterclaim was filed thirty-four months earlier, the Judge concluded
Defendant should have already produced an expert, even while recognizing there had not
been a discovery cut-off, R 825, line 20, to R 826, line 4. The Judge found Roller's position

6

There were actually 372 pages in the file. Pages 71 through 372 dealt with the
Partial Summary Judgment Motion. Most of the material the Judge would
not have read was Roller's Affidavit, R 200-231, and Roller's Answers to
Plaintiffs First Interrogatories, R 232-297, and Roller's Supplemental
Answers, R 298-346. Plaintiff produced no affidavits, but confined its Motion
and Memorandum, R 71-158, to selected parts of Defendant's Answers to
Interrogatories to show Defendant had not identified an expert.
12

"not credible", R 826, line 13. He ruled without becoming familiar with Roller's Affidavit
and responses, R 159-199, 200-231, 232-346, and the material facts presented in it, R 808,
827. Koller was familiar with all the matters and the facts, having participated throughout
Plaintiffs prior representation, R 187-197, 200-231.
During most of the 34 months after the lawsuit was filed and before August 29,1995,
neither Plaintiff, Defendant, nor the Court advanced the case by requesting or conducting
a discovery conference (Rule 26 (f) Utah R. Civ. P.), a pre-trial conference, setting a cut-off
date for discovery, or setting a trial. Meanwhile, settlement discussions, plus formal and
informal7 discovery took place. The Court asked for a status hearing May 22, 1995, R 69.
Shortly thereafter, July 5., 1995, Plaintiff served its Motion for Summary Judgment, R 71.
Defendant had requested a jury December 10, 1992.

Koller was actually on notice only

since August 29, 1995, R 826, he would be required to obtain an expert. Koller claims the
Court's ruling, the 60-day deadline set by the Court, and the Court's refusal to grant an
extension of time are abuses of discretion.
4.

Koller moved for an extension of Time.

Besides farm work that had to be done in its season, R 505-507, Koller prepared
Affidavits for the Court which were filed August 21, 1995, R 200-231; October 11, 1995, R
481-496; and October 25, 1995, R 505-507. These showed material facts were disputed in
the malpractice counterclaim. These also supported Roller's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the accounting issues. Koller helped counsel prepare numerous pleadings that
had to be filed after August 29, 1995, R 200-547. He met several days with counsel from

7

R 67, 185, 189 and paragraph 10, R 202
13

two different Salt Lake City law firms to teach them about the case and obtain opinions, R
505-507. The Affidavit from Jeffrey W. Appel, first supplied December 14, 1995, after the
60-days allowed August 29, 1995, was not even acknowledged by the Court, R 626.
Roller moved ex parte October 24,1995 for an extension of time to get an expert, but
gave Plaintiff notice, R 499-509. The Court did not consider the motion because it was ex
parte, R 563, 509, 547-550. The Court would not set the Motion for a hearing, R 563.
When the Court wrote its Memorandum Decision November 22, 1995, it held that the
motion had already been denied.8 The Memorandum Decision formally denied Roller's
Motion for Extension of Time. The Court did not say why it did this, except that its original
deadline had not been met. The original deadline had not been supported by specific
findings there were not material disputed issues of fact. Nor could it have been supported
by specific findings, because the Judge had not read the affidavits, R 808, 809, 827.
The Trial Court did not decide which malpractice issues would require expert
testimony, and which might not, R 827, Lines 1 to 6. The Judge actually commented that
some malpractice issues might not require an expert, R 827.
5.

Facts About Other Issues.

Not decided by the Trial Court was the accounting question. The parties each filed
motions for Summary Judgment on the accounting issue, R 71, 378. Defendant's case is

Since the Court had not considered the motion on its merits, the only possible
reason the motion "has already (been) denied" is because Defendant asked
the Court to grant it ex parte because of the rapidly approaching deadline.
The Court said November 22, 1995 a hearing "is now moot", R 563.
14

somewhat persuasive, R 162-179,455-480, esp. 464-465.9 The Court of Appeals could grant
Koller Partial Summary Judgment on the accounting issues, for the principal amount of
$11,669.78. It could also grant Koller attorney fees on appeal. But for Defendant's
Counterclaim, which alleged accounting disparities in addition to legal malpractice, the Trial
Court would have granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint because the
Complaint was not served within the period of time allowed by the rules, R 564, Part II of
November 2, 1995 Memorandum Decision. Defendant had correctly pointed out the Court
lacked jurisdiction on Plaintiff's Complaint, but argued the Court did have jurisdiction on
the Counterclaim, R 163-165, 464-465.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The main question to be answered by this Interlocutory Appeal is whether Roller's
malpractice Counterclaim against Preston should be restored, and tried before the requested
jury.10 The Counterclaim should be reinstated because (1) Defendant could testify himself
about part of the duty of care, and (2) Defendant's expert was unable to fully prepare by
October 28,1995, but Jeffrey W. Appel could testify Plaintiff failed to meet its duty of care.
Defendant could testify about matters which he personally knows, including more

9

Plaintiff admitted to total payments from Koller starting November 1, 1979
and thereafter of $79,933.31, R 167, 178-180. See Addendum. On the other
hand, Plaintiff established he paid $97,335.52 or $17,402.21 more, during the
same period, R 201. Since Plaintiff sued for $5,732.43, Koller should get
Partial Summary Judgment for a principal amount overpayment of $11,669.78
on the accounting issue.

i°

A jury was demanded December 10,1992 while the case was still handled by
the Cache County Department of the First District Court, Case No. 92-690;
and again September 29, 1995, when the case was in the District Court, R 18,
438.
IS

obvious breaches of the duty. The deadline imposed by the Court to get an expert with
"fully" prepared, with "final" opinions in 60 days was an abuse of discretion because there
was no discovery cut-off, there had been no Pre-Trial Conference, the parties had not
completed discovery, and a trial date was not set. Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion was
made after the Court had sent, R 69, notice for a status conference, when all such things
could have been considered. The motion was premature and should not have been granted.
Removal of a cause of action under Rule 37, U.R.C.P., is only appropriate after a
discovery order has not been complied with. No such order had been made or refused. The
question for Summary Judgment should not have been whether Defendant then had proof
Plaintiff failed to meet its duties of care, but whether there were material disputed facts.
Defendant's Affidavits and deposition are sufficient to establish there were, or could have
been, breaches of duty.
Defendant's expert, Jeffrey W. Appel, can present his expert opinions about the duty
of care the Plaintiff had to (1) distinguish between appropriated water rights in comparison
with deeded water rights; (2) to defend the Cornish condemnation action; (3) to prepare the
Court's Findings and Amended Findings; and (4) additional items consistent with Mr.
Appel's Affidavit dated December 14, 1995, R 589-594.
On the other hand, facts supporting Partial Summary Judgment for Defendant, that
Koller clearly paid more than he was credited by Plaintiff, are clear. When the Court made
its rulings, that there were material issues of fact, the Plaintiff had provided sworn answers
acknowledging $17,402.21 less had been paid than was actually paid. The Trial Court's
findings should be reviewed for correctness, and Partial Summary Judgment awarded to
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Koller. Within the time of these rulings, Plaintiff did not refute Roller's evidence, R 201,
that Defendant overpaid Plaintiff at least $11,669.78, the difference between $97,335.52
Koller paid, R 201, and the $79,933.31 Plaintiff said was paid, R 32-34, after November 1,
1979, less the amount ($5,732.43) Plaintiff sued for, R 4.
If the Court determines Plaintiff asserted its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
without good faith, or that the Trial Court's decision was clearly erroneous, Koller should
be awarded attorney fees on appeal.
Many facts pertaining primarily to the first issue are set forth in the argument.
ARGUMENT
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN SUMMARILY HOLDING
KOLLER COULD NOT PREVAIL ON MALPRACTICE
ISSUES?

The Trial Court granted Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Motion because
Defendant had not designated an expert witness. Defendant had Counterclaimed for legal
malpractice against Plaintiff after Plaintiff sued Defendant for $5,732.43, plus interest.
Defendant had also counterclaimed for accounting errors by the Plaintiff. This part of the
case remains to be tried, but could be simplified if the Court of appeals decides to review
the Trial Court's decision and grant Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c),
Rollins v.Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156,1158 (Utah 1991); Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d
1127,1129 (Utah 1990); and many other citations. The full Utah Supreme Court agreed in
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992):
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Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, rather than fact, we
are free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. . . We grant no
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, but review them for
correctness. . . (Citations omitted.)
Sandy City, at 218.
As the non-moving party, Koller is entitled to have his view of the facts presumed
correct for purposes of the appeal. In Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949,
954 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. . . (Citations omitted) We state the facts of the instant
case-which we draw primarily from Retherford's affidavit submitted in
opposition to AT&T's motion to dismiss-accordingly. See Sandy City v. Salt
Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 215 (Utah 1992).
Retherford, at 954.
To successfully attack the Trial Court's ruling on Summary Judgment, it is not
necessary to first marshall evidence supporting its decision and to then demonstrate that,
even if viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the decision. Cases supporting this requirement, such as Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d
1176, 1178 (Utah 1989), require a marshalling all facts which support a ruling, but only
where the evidence was presented in trial. This is not the standard for review of a Summary
Judgment decision. Here, facts and inferences are to be viewed most favorably to Koller.
All the facts and inferences known to the Trial Court, or rather the facts the Trial Court
could have learned if it had read Defendant's Affidavit, show there are issues of material
fact about Plaintiffs malpractice.
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A. FACTS PERTAINING TO THIS ISSUE.
Facts that demonstrate the merits of Roller's malpractice claim are contained in the
Affidavit of Evan Koller, dated August 18, 1995, R 200-231, and argued in Defendant's
"Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing
Claim for Attorneys Fees and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Counterclaim", R 162-199, which includes exhibits A through E. (These
exhibits are in Addendum.)

These are among the materials to which the Court had

reference when the Judge said he did not read the pleadings, R 827.11 The Honorable Ben
H. Hadfield said August 29, 1995:
I'm not going to go through the file at this point and read his 32 page
affidavit, plus all the interrogatory answers and other things, and start
identifying this issue doesn't need expertise, this one does, this one doesn't.
I'm not going to get into that kind of exercise at this point. R 827.
Additional facts submitted by Evan Koller include his Affidavit dated October 11,
1995, R 481-496. This Affidavit, which is also Exhibit 14 to the Docketing Statement filed
with Supreme Court Case No. 960162, was filed because the accounting issue was also raised
by Plaintiff, R 378, on September 11, 1995 as an additional matter for Partial Summary

These and Roller's Interrogatory Answers had been filed before the hearing.
These were documents the Judge had not read at the beginning of the
hearing, so he said, "If s not likely that I'll be able to give you a decision this
morning on the issue", R 809, Line 5. The Judge earlier said, "I looked at
this file this morning for the first time. I didn't know I had it on my calendar.
I think there's possibly 200 pages there. I've done some speed reading this
morning between hearings, but I don't think I have reviewed more than half
of what is there. I have reviewed all of the memoranda, but the exhibits, and
the affidavits, and the supporting documentation, I have only partially worked
through", R 808, Line 19.
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Judgment. August 18, 1995, Koller first moved for Partial Summary Judgment on the
accounting question, R 161. Only the malpractice question was argued August 29, 1995.
Plaintiffs September 11,1995 motion, plus Memorandum in Support thereof, R 379392, and attached Affidavit, R 393-411, all had to be answered while Defendant was also
trying to obtain an expert.

Roller's response filed October 11, 1995, includes the

Memorandum beginning on page 456 of the Record. The Memorandum responds to
Plaintiffs Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment and provides Roller's Reply in support
of his own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Not insubstantial, it continues through
page 480 of the Record, and is followed by Evan Roller's Affidavit of October 11, 1995, R
481-496.12
All these Affidavits, Answers to Interrogatories, and Roller's deposition were
available to the Court when it made its rulings. On the other hand, Plaintiff presented no
affidavits. Plaintiff merely argued Roller had not yet offered an expert to testify about
whether these disputed facts breached Plaintiffs duty to Roller.
Meanwhile, Plaintiffs counsel gratuitously (and successfully!) tried to improve the
Court's decision of August 29, 1995, that Defendant obtain an expert within 60 days and
make that expert available to be deposed. Mr. Hanni wrote the Court August 31, 1995, R
375, admitting the Judge's decision had not required the expert to be "fully" prepared and
ready to express "final" opinions on the malpractice claims. He said he added this language
anyway. Defendant filed an Objection, R 412, 413, and requested a hearing on that

An extension of time to reply to Plaintiffs Motion on the accounting was
granted to Defendant, R 445 and 448.
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question, R 412-413. This was briefed by the Plaintiff, R 424-435, and the Defendant, R
442-444. The Partial Summary Judgment was entered September 25, 1995, R 452, without
a hearing on Defendant's Objections as to Form.
Before the August 29, 1995 hearing, the sworn evidence was completed August 22,
1996 by filing Evan O. Keller's Answers, and Supplemental Answers, to Interrogatories with
Exhibits. Defendant's Motion to publish these is at R 346. The Order was granted
September 14, 1995, R 422, but they were already available to the Judge. Evan Roller's
Answers to Plaintiffs First Interrogatories and Second Request for Production of
Documents are in the Record at pages 232-297. Evan Roller's Supplemental Answers to
Plaintiffs First Interrogatories and Second Request for Production of Documents are at
pages 298-345. The Record was further supplemented with Evan O. Roller's original
deposition, the Motion for which was filed September 11, 1995 by the Plaintiff, R 377; and
stipulated to October 11, 1995 by Defendant, R 454.
Mr. Roller's deposition taken May 10, 1993, is to be included in the Record on
Appeal at pages

, but was not indexed by the Clerk. It contains 83 pages, plus

49 pages of Exhibits 1 through 9. It should probably be Record pages 830 through 961.
With all these matters being addressed at and after the August 29, 1995 hearing,
which fill half of Volume 1 and all the materials in Volume II, R 232-498, of the Court
Record, Defendant moved October 25, 1995 for an extension of time to provide expert
witnesses, R 499. Roller's Memorandum, R 01, refers to the numerous pleadings and
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matters going on in the file after August 29,1995 R 499-508.13 It outlines the matters which
had transpired since the hearing, R 501-504, and was supported by Evan Roller's Affidavit
of October 24, 1995, R 505-507. The extension was opposed, R 534, 546. The Judge did
not allow the requested hearing, R 547, but issued a Memorandum Decision November 22,
1995, R 563-565.
Defendant immediately filed a Motion for a New Trial, Motion to Reconsider, and
Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification, R 567-568. This was supported by a
Memorandum in Support of the Motion, R 569-576. As soon as it was available, the
Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel was sent by facsimile to the Court, R 577-585, and the original
was filed December 21, 1995, R 586-594.
Plaintiff immediately continued to press for Summary Judgment on his accounting
question, and on December 29, 1995, submitted a Supplemental Affidavit, R 604, 605-615.
Before the Judge's next Memorandum Decision, Plaintiff also moved for attorney
fees, R 616-625. Roller's memorandum opposed this, R 638-639. On January 12, 1996,
Roller filed his Reply Memorandum in Support of a Motion for a New Trial, Motion to
Reconsider, and Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification, and Evan Roller's
Supplemental Affidavit of January 11, 1996, R 640-675. These were not short factual
statements. They show Roller knew a great deal about the factual issues. The detailed facts

The letter to the Court and Plaintiffs counsel dated October 24,1995, R 508,
reminded the Judge that Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
together with the Plaintiffs Motion on the accounting, were still before the
Court and that memoranda had been filed on all these after the hearing
August 29. Several reasons were stated about why extending the time would
be in the interest of justice.
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there and in prior affidavits cannot be fairly summarized. Roller's initial Affidavit opposing
summary judgment and the exhibits that were attached with it and the Memorandum, are
in the Addendum.
The Memorandum Decision was dated February 22, 1996, R 676-681. Pages 71
through 683, about 612 pages of the Record, all deal with Summary Judgment. Summary
Judgment is supposed to make the judicial function more efficient! When one considers the
hours on both sides and the Court's time, had the Court read the affidavits and agreed there
are materials issues of fact in dispute, and conducted a status conference to schedule
discovery cut-off dates on August 29, 1995, it could have saved lots of time and expense for
all. For example, the affidavits may now be studied by everyone arguing or deciding the
appeal, instead of just one wise Trial Judge. There is no reason the Trial Court could not
have conducted a discoveiy conference, set discovery cut-off dates, and even set a trial date
on August 29, 1995. It should have refused or delayed Summary Judgment.
B. ARGUMENT ON THIS ISSUE.
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. allows the adverse party to serve opposing affidavits prior to the
day of hearing. It has been shown that opposing affidavits had been so furnished. This rule
only allows Summary Judgment to be granted:
.. .If the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. . .
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.
Because Summary Judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the Court
of Appeals is free to reappraise the Trial Court's legal conclusions. This may be done
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without deference to the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law. Rather, the Trial Court's
Conclusions should be reviewed for correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d
212, 218 (Utah 1992).
In reviewing a grant of Summary Judgment, the Appeals Court should view the facts
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.

Retherford v. AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah 1992).

In

Retherford, the facts were stated primarily from the non-moving party's affidavit submitted
in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order of Summary Judgment was
reversed and the case remanded. Another example of this standard of review and this result
is Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991).
II.

WAS IT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO GRANT PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING A MALPRACTICE
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE
AN EXPERT BEFORE DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETED?

The elements of legal malpractice need only be supported by some competent
evidence to avoid Summary Judgment. Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App.
1993). Rule 37, Utah R.Civ.P. contemplates dismissal of a claim only after a discovery order
is refused. Much later chances to get the expert were allowed in Hoopilaina v. IHC 740
P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). Where reasonable minds could differ on whether
Defendant's conduct met the required standard, a genuine issue of fact exists. Jackson v.
Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Expert testimony is not necessarily always required
in legal malpractice cases. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah App.
1989).
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The elements of legal malpractice include: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) a
duty of the attorney to the client; (3) a breach of that duty; (4) damages suffered by the
client proximately caused by the attorney's breach of duty. These elements are set forth in
Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993). The Harline decision held that the
elements of legal malpractice need only be supported by "some competent evidence to
support each element" to avoid Summary Judgment. IdL, at 598.
The question August 29, 1995 was whether Koller had competent evidence to show
Plaintiff breached its duty to Defendant. Without reading Roller's Affidavit, Answers to
Interrogatories, and the exhibits thereto, the Trial Court guessed an expert would eventually
be required. The Trial Court recognized that some issues may not need expertise to
establish the duty of care. The Judge said he did not want to read Roller's 32-page Affidavit
and identify "this issue doesn't need expertise", "this one does", "this one doesn't", R 827,
lines 1 through 5. If the Judge had chosen to "get into that kind of exercise", he could have
made Findings absolute in nature that expertise was required. He did not. The inferences
available from the existence of Roller's unread Affidavit are sufficient to justify a conclusion
that Roller could testify himself.
The thrust of Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion was not whether Plaintiff
breached its duty, but whether Defendant had an expert who would so testify. Plaintiff
argued Defendant could not himself testify because the issues were too complex. The
reasonable conclusions and inferences from Roller's Affidavit are that the case was not too
complex for Roller to show there were issues of material fact in dispute.
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In Harline, Mr. Harline opposed Mr. Barker's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Barker claimed he breached no duty. Summary Judgment was reversed. Footnote 2 in this
decision refers to an attempt by the Defendant to claim the Summary Judgment was
appropriate because an expert had not been produced. The Court of Appeals refused to
consider that issue for the first time on appeal. Now that the Court of Appeals may
consider this issue, it should still reject the argument that a case should be dismissed just
because the claimant has not yet produced an expert. The Defendant in Harline also had
a defense of ignorance that Plaintiff had falsified bankruptcy schedules. It is distinguishable
from the instant case because there are no allegations Koller hid information or misled the
Plaintiff in any of its legal representation. The instant case presents an even stronger case
for reversal.
All that should have been required by the Trial Court to reject Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is to have found from the basis of facts in the record that
reasonable minds could differ on whether the attorney's conduct met the required standard.
That fact was not required to be shown by an expert witness in Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d
613, 615 (Utah 1982). Justice Oaks in that decision stated:
Ordinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required standard of care
is a question of fact for the jury. (Citations omitted.) Consequently, a motion
for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a
genuine issue of material fact, which, if resolved in favor of the non-moving
party would entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)
(Other citations omitted.) A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis
of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether
defendants' conduct measures up to the required standard.
Jackson at 615.
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A. WAS AN EXPERT REQUIRED TO DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
No. Whether an expert witness is required in legal malpractice cases is case sensitive
and definitely not an established doctrine. Harline cites an earlier decision, Wvcalis v.
Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah App. 1989), to discuss the standard of care,
acknowledging expert testimony is ordinarily presented to establish standard of care in cases
dealing with duties owed by a particular profession. Harline at 598, note 2. Wvcalis dealt
with an alleged breach of duty by a trustee, Guardian Title. After pointing out why the
applicable standard had not been established as a matter of law, the Court went on to state:
Accordingly, the standard must be established factually in the course of
ultimate resolution of this case, with an emphasis on standard-of-care-in-theindustry evidence.8 (Note 8 is part of the Wvcalis decision.)
Footnote 8 referred to, is helpful in the present case and reads as follows:
Expert testimony may be particularly helpful in elucidating the standard of
care applicable here. Where the average person has little understanding of
the duties owed by particular trades or professions, expert testimony must
ordinarily be presented to establish the standard of care. For instance, expert
testimony has been required to establish the standard of care for medical
doctors (citations omitted); architects (citations omitted); engineers (citations
omitted); insurance brokers (citations omitted); and professional estate
executors (citations omitted).
Wvcalis at 826.
Two things are instructive here from Wvcalis. First, the Court did not see fit to
include lawyers in the listed professions in the footnote. Although it could have added them
to the list, the fact that it did not suggests that expert testimony is not always required.
Second, the reference that an "average person has little understanding of the duties owed
by particular trades or professions" infers that so-called average people have at least some
understanding. Koller himself could be considered more knowledgeable than many non-
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lawyers about the duty he expected because of familiarity with his cases. He certainly could
testify about the facts and what he asked from the representation by the Plaintiff.
This Court has reversed Summary Judgment initially granted for lack of an expert to
establish the duty of care for a landlord. In Schrieder v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570
(Utah App. 1994), the Court again discussed the question of whether expert testimony is
either "helpful" or "necessary". In reversing, this Court referred to Wycalis, Supra., quoting
Footnote 8 therefrom, which is also quoted above from Page 826. The Schrieder decision
concluded that the Defendant Wasatch Manor had not shown an expert's testimony would
be absolutely required. It then went on to state:
Where the propriety of the Defendant's action "is within the common
knowledge and experience of the lay man. . .the guidance provided by expert
testimony is unnecessary." Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2 348, 352 (Utah 1980).
Schrieder at 574.
In commenting on whether expert testimony would be helpful in Schrieder, the Court
concluded that a jury could reasonably find that Wasatch Manor was negligent, absent
expert testimony. The Court said, "This is simply not a situation where the issues or facts
appear to be so complex or technical that they would otherwise delude the mental processes
of the average citizen." In the present case, Plaintiff argued that the issues were too
complex for the average citizen, but did not prove it. The Trial Court should have
construed the facts favorably to Koller. How could it? The Trial Court did not take time
to review Roller's Affidavits or exhibits. It therefore had a very incomplete basis to evaluate
the actual complexity of the issues or the actual need for expert testimony.
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B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ACT TOO QUICKLY?
Yes. The Trial Court acted prematurely by imposing the sanction of dismissing
Roller's Counterclaim because Roller did not yet have an expert. Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P.
is directly applicable to this case because it refers to consequences for failures to make or
cooperate in discovery and sanctions therefore. The important points of Rule 37 are:
(A) Motion for Order Compelling Discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an
order compelling discovery as follows:
(2) Motion. If . . . a party fails to answer an interrogatory. . . the
discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer. . .
(B) Failure to Comply with Order.
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party . . .
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an
order made under subdivision (A) of this rule. . . or if a party fails to
obey an order entered under Rule 26(f) (relating to discovery
conferences), the court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the
following:
(A) An order that the matters. . .(are) established. . .
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support
or oppose designated claims or defenses or prohibiting him
from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the
action or proceeding or any party thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party;
Rule 37 only contemplates the dismissal of a claim after a discovery order has been
refused. No such discovery order was ever entered in this case. In fact, the discovery
conference contemplated (Rule 26(f), Utah R. Civ. P.) was not even attempted by the Court
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or the Plaintiff. It should have been. Rule 37 should have been complied with. It was
disregarded.
The severe action taken by the Trial Court is not only against the procedure
contemplated by the Rules of Civil Procedure, it is also contrary to appropriate discretion.
In Hoopilaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987), the Plaintiff
needed to prove that quinidine intended for another patient, but given to Hoopilaina by
mistake caused injury to the Plaintiff. Judge Greenwood's summary explains why the Trial
Court should have allowed Koller much longer to obtain an expert:
Plaintiff claimed that the drug caused injuries to his lungs and cardiovascular
system. On February 9,1984, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
based on plaintiffs failure to establish, through expert testimony, that the
quinidine caused his injuries. Plaintiff admitted he did not have an expert,
but asserted that he was attempting to obtain one and would have one before
trial. Based on the representation, the court denied the motion without
prejudice. The defendant filed a certificate of readiness for trial on May 5,
1984, and the trial was set for September 17, 1984. Plaintiff did not object to
the certification or the trial date. Defendant renewed his motion for summary
judgment in July, 1984, and plaintiff again said he was trying to find an expert.
The trial judge denied the motion and admonished plaintiff that he must have
an expert. One week prior to trial at the pre-trial conference, Plaintiff was
again asked about the expert. Plaintiffs counsel informed the judge that he
would subpoena a doctor and hope that the doctor would testify as to
causation. The trial judge found this to be insufficient and granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Emphasis added.)
Hoopilaina, at 271.
This Trial Court should, and could, have allowed Koller far greater latitude in
obtaining an expert without even approaching the deadlines allowed in Hoopilaina.
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in.

MAY A FORMER CLIENT, ROLLER, TESTIFY PLAINTIFF
BREACHED ITS DUTY OF CARE RESPECTING BILLINGS,
CONFLICTS, DISCLOSURES, DISCOVERY, FACTUAL
ARGUMENTS, OR OTHER MATTERS WITHIN THE
CLIENTS EXPERIENCE?

Yes. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980), applied this principle in the
medical malpractice context and held that expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the
duty of care where the propriety of treatment is within the common knowledge and
experience of the layman. This concept is consistent with legal malpractice cases, including
Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n 8 (Utah App. 1989), Jackson v. Dabnev. 645
P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982), Harline v. Barker, 854 P. 2d 595 (Utah App. 1993), Brown v.
Small 825 P. 2d 1209 (Mont. 1992) and Wilkinson v. Rives. 116 Cal. App. 3d 641, 647
(Cal.Ct.App. 1981), and Rule 701, Utah R. Evidence (lay opinions).
Nixdorf was referred to in the prior section. The actual language of Nixdorf, which
involved the reversal of a directed verdict in favor of Defendant physician, was as follows:
However, this court has recognized certain exceptions to the general rule
requiring expert testimony. (Citations omitted.) Specifically, expert testimony
is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the Plaintiff where the
propriety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and
experience of the layman. The loss of a surgical instrument or other
paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment. We
explained in Fredrickson v. Maw: . . .If, however, a surgeon should lose the
instrument in the incision.. . it would seem as a matter of common sense that
scientific opdnion could throw little light on the subject.
Nixdorf at 352.
Whether Plaintiffs failures dropped to the level of leaving an instrument in an
operating site is a question of fact. The presumptions and inferences to which Koller is
entitled allow this Court to conclude, as the Trial Court should have concluded, that
Plaintiffs alleged failure to meet the duty of care could have dropped to that level, thus
31

enabling Koller himself to establish the duty of care in some areas of the malpractice
claim.14
Utah R. Evidence 701, Opinion testimony by lay persons, allows lay witnesses to
testify to a significant extent! It states as follows:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences are limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
(Emphasis added.)
The duty of care required is a fact issue. Rule 702, Opinion testimony by experts, expands
to explain how a lay or expert is qualified on expert topics. It states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
To a limited extent, Koller may well qualify to provide opinions of the duty of care required
by the Plaintiff based on the Plaintiffs course of performance in representing him in
numerous matters over a period of 15 years, their communications, their billings, their
disclosures, instructions from Koller, and similar matters.
Other jurisdictions have approved the concept that in legal malpractice actions, a
former client's testimony may be sufficient to establish a breach of the required duty of care.
One such example is Brown v. Small 825 P.2d 1209 (Mont. 1992), which stated:

Even if Koller could not so testify, he should have been allowed more time
to get an expert. See Arguments for Issues 2 and 4.
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.. .There are instances in which legal malpractice actions have been submitted
for fact determination without the use of expert testimony. The theory in
such cases is that the attorney's misconduct is so obvious that no reasonable
jury could not comprehend the lawyer's breach of duty. [Citing Carlson v.
Morton, 745 P.2d 1133, (Mont. 1987)].
Was Plaintiffs breach of duty so obvious that a reasonable jury could comprehend it?
Inferences to which Roller was entitled at the August 29, 1995 hearing suggest a jury could
comprehend those breaches. The Trial Court did not analyze Roller's documents and
affidavits sufficient to actually make a finding. The Trial Court had available many of the
cases discussed in this Brief when it considered the memoranda relating to the Motion for
Summary Judgment August 29, 1995. Included in the briefs were Wvcalis, Harline, and
Brown. The Trial Court failed to appreciate these decisions argued against granting
Summary Judgment, at least at that stage of the proceedings.
The California decision of Wilkinson v. Rives, 116 Cal.App.3d 641 (Cal.Ct.App. 1981)
stated:
Where the failure of attorney performance is so clear that a trier of fact may
find professional negligence unassisted by expert testimony, then expert
testimony is not required. (Citing Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal.App.3d 802.)
Wilkinson at 647.
The case referred to in Wilkinson, Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal.App.3d 802 (Cal.Ct.App.
1975) contains this statement:
In some circumstances, the failure of attorney performance may be so clear
that a trier of fact may find professional negligence unaided by the testimony
of experts. Where, however, the malpractice action is brought against an
attorney holding himself out as a legal specialist and the claim against him is
related to his expertise as such, then only a person knowledgeable in the
speciality can define the applicable duty of care and opine whether it was met.
(Citation omitted.)
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In the instant case, while Plaintiff has argued representation by Preston & Chambers was
complicated, it has not argued the Plaintiff lawfirm held itself out as legal specialists
requiring knowledge of a specialist to establish their duty of care.
Even the Trial Court acknowledged that the duty of care in some of Roller's claim
could be established by Roller's testimony alone, R 827. In a legal malpractice case, the
former client should always be able to state his opinion as to whether he thinks the Plaintiff
breached the duty. While such testimony may not be given as much weight as testimony
from an expert, it should be given some weight. This is consistent with the well-established
principle that a property owner may give his opinion about his own property. Anderson v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978), recites this as follows:
This Court has long adhered to the rule that an owner of property is entitled
to give his opinion thereon. (Citations omitted.) . . .His testimony is to be
given such weight and credibility as the trier of fact finds reasonable under the
circumstances.
Anderson at 104.
This issue can also be considered in light of the other cases in prior arguments.
Koller may testify as to matters within his experience and provide his opinions about many
issues regarding Plaintiffs representation of his cases. He will be able to testify the Plaintiff
did not meet obvious duties.

34

IV-

MAY DEFENDANTS EXPERT JEFFREY W. APPEL TESTIFY
ABOUT THE DUTY OF CARE PLAINTIFF OWED (1) TO
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN APPROPRIATED AND DEEDED
WATER RIGHTS; (2) TO DEFEND AGAINST A FEE TITLE
TAKING IN THE CORNISH CONDEMNATION ACTION; (3)
TO PREP^LRE COMPLETE FINDINGS FOR THE COURT;
AND (4) TO PERFORM THE ADDITIONAL ITEMS AS
REFERRED TO IN MR. APPEL'S AFFIDAVIT DATED
DECEMBER 14, 1995, R 587-594?

The same argument that applies for the first two issues applies to answer that the
alleged "late" availability of Mr. Appel's testimony, should be allowed. The sanctions
imposed by Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P. do not suggest dismissal until there is disobedience to
an Order to Compel. Opportunities to get an expert much closer to the trial date were
allowed in Hoopilaina v. IHC 740 P.2d 270,271 (Utah App. 1987) and Utah R. of Evidence
703, regarding opinion testimony by experts, suggests this issue is easily answered "yes" for
appeal purposes.

Mr. Jeffrey W. Appel's testimony should be admissible under Rule 703

Utah R. Evidence, Bases of opinion testimony by experts:
The facts or date in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or date need not be admissible in evidence.
We have discussed that Defendant himself has perceptions about his particular cases,
and should be able to express his opinions. Based on his affidavit, R 587-594, Addendum
Exhibit 4, Mr. Appel will be able to express opinions. He may rely on the record of this
case, the records of the parties to the underlying cases, and be able to express the duty of
care required, without necessarily admitting into evidence facts or data upon which he bases
some of those opinions. Rule 703, second sentence.
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Mr. Appel should be able to testify whether the Plaintiff achieved the duty of care
stated in Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 1988) that:
Once an attorney-client relationship has been established, the attorney
"impliedly agrees to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance
of the tasks which they undertake. (Citations omitted.)
Williams at 889.
V.

WHETHER THE EVIDENCE, PLUS ALL REASONABLE
INFERENCES FAIRLY DRAWN FROM THAT EVIDENCE
INTERPRETED MOST FAVORABLY TO DEFENDANT WHO
OPPOSED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IS SUFFICIENT FOR
ROLLER TO PREVAIL IN HIS MALPRACTICE
COUNTERCLAIM?

The same standards argued for issues No. 1, 2, 3, and 4 apply to this issue. In legal
malpractice cases, it is summarized in Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P. 2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982).
The allegations against Dabney by Mr. Jackson were that he did not do as much as he could
have done to prevent a foreclosure sale. Dabney supposedly should have reduced the
judgment to writing, confirmed the settlement with a letter, and/or taken the money to the
creditor. This factual setting gave rise to a reversal of Summary Judgment. The words of
Justice Oaks referred to above in this argument hold true in this case too. There indeed
is a genuine issue of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ on whether the lawyer's
conduct measured up to the required standard.
Because reasonable minds could differ on whether Plaintiffs conduct measured up
to the required standard, this case should be remanded because Koller may prevail on his
malpractice Counterclaim.
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VI.

SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT GRANT PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO
DEFENDANT ROLLER ON THE
ACCOUNTING ISSUES?

This is an issue of law to be decided after the facts established by affidavit are
reviewed. This Court need not defer to the ruling of the lower Court, but should review it
for correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 217, 218 (Utah 1992).
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
56(c). In reviewing Summary Judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom are to be reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Retherford
v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah 1992).
Facts sufficient for this Court to review whether Koller should be awarded Partial
Summary Judgment of the accounting issue are sufficiently referred to in the Statement of
Facts to allow the Court of Appeals to affirmatively answer this question.
VII.

SHOULD THE COURT OF APPEALS GRANT KOLLER
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL?

Utah Code §78-27-56 allows attorney fees in civil actions to the prevailing party. If
the Court determines Plaintiff asserted its claim or its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment without good faith, or that the Trial Court's decision was clearly erroneous, Koller
could be awarded attorney fees on appeal. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Ut.Ct.App.
1991).
The Jeschke case is all about attorney fees in the trial court. In writing for the Court
of Appeals, Judge Jackson writes that the Trial Judge erred in his award of Rule 11
sanctions, but affirmed the award of attorney fees because Mr. Jeschke purposely
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disregarded the truth and misrepresented material facts. The last paragraph of the opinion
notes that Defendant requested sanctions and attorney fees on appeal. The Court of
Appeals declined to award sanctions and fees on appeal. Koller is asking for is fees on
appeal if this Court concludes the law and facts in this case did not support the motion
made by the Plaintiff and the decision by the Trial Court.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court granted Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Motion because
Defendant had not designated an expert witness. Defendant had Counterclaimed for legal
malpractice against Plaintiff after Plaintiff sued Defendant for $5,732.43, plus interest.
Defendant also counterclaimed over accounting overbillings by the Plaintiff. The accounting
issues remain to be tried, but could be simplified if the Court of Appeals reviews the Trial
Court's decision and grants Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The elements of legal malpractice are supported by competent evidence sufficient to
avoid Summary Judgment. Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993). Rule
37, Utah R.Civ.P. contemplates dismissal of a claim only after a discovery order is refused.
No Order existed August 29, 1996. Much closer-to-trial chances to get an expert were
allowed in Hoopilaina v. IHC 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). Where reasonable
minds could differ on whether Defendant's conduct met the required standard, a genuine
issue of fact exists. Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). The real issue is
whether there were disputed facts, not whether Defendant could prove the duty of care.
Expert testimony is not necessarily always required in legal malpractice cases. Wycalis v.
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Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah App. 1989) does not list the legal profession
as these where an expert's opinion of breach of duty is always required.
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) held that expert testimony is
unnecessary to establish the duty of care in medical cases where the propriety of treatment
is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman. Legal malpractice cases
are in step with this pattern. Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n 8 (Utah App.
1989), Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982), Harline v. Barker, 854 P. 2d 595
(Utah App. 1993), Brown v. Small, 825 P. 2d 1209 (Mont. 1992) and Wilkinson v. Rives, 116
Cal. App. 3d 641, 647 (Cal.Ct.App. 1981), all allow for the possibility that lay testimony of
the duty can be enough.
The "late" availability of Jeffrey W. Appel's expert opinion is still before any
discovery conference or discovery cut-off date. The sanctions imposed by Rule 37, U.R. Civ.
Pro. do not suggest dismissal until there is disobedience to an Order to Compel.
The legal malpractice standard summarized in Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P. 2d 613, 615
(Utah 1982) caused reversal of Summary Judgment. Justice Oaks acknowledged these, and
probably would acknowledge here, that there indeed was a genuine issue of fact upon which
reasonable minds could differ on whether the lawyer's conduct measured up to the required
standard. There was no mention of the need for an expert to so testify as of the Summary
Judgment hearing.
This Court need not defer to rulings of the lower Court, but should review them for
correctness. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 217,218 (Utah 1992). Summary
Judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). In
reviewing Summary Judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are
to be reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Retherford v. AT&T
Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 954 (Utah 1992).
Utah Code §78-27-56 allows attorney fees in civil actions to the prevailing party. If
the Court determines Plaintiff asserted its claim or its Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment without good faith, or that the Trial Court's decision was clearly erroneous, Koller
should be awarded attorney fees on appeal. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Ut.Ct.App.
1991).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of November, 1996.

RAYMOND N. MALOUF
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of November, 1996, two true and correct copies
of the foregoing, BRIEF OF APPELLANT EVAN O. KOLLER, were mailed postage prepaid
to the following:
Mr. Glenn C. Hanni
Mr. Peter H. Christensen
Attorneys at Law
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RAYMOND N. MALOUF
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LIST OF EXHIBITS ATTACHED TO DOCKETING STATEMENT
Exhibit:

Record Page No.

Order, March 18, 1996
682-683
Memorandum Decision, February 21, 1996
679-680
Memorandum Decision, February 5, 1996
676-677
Reply Memorandum, in Support of Motion
for New Trial, Motion to Reconsider and
Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certification, January 11, 1996
628-633
Order Re: Dismissal, January 11, 1995
626-627
Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel, December 14, 1995
587-594
Motion for New Trial, Motion to Reconsider
and Alternative Motion for 54(b) Certification,
December 13, 1995
567-568
Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial,
Motion to Reconsider and Alternative Motion
for Rule 54(b) Certificate, December 13, 1995
569-576
Memorandum Decision, November 22, 1995
563-566
Evan Roller's Reply to Objection to Defendant's
Motion for Hearing, November 3, 1995
560
Motion for Hearing, October 30, 1995
547
Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Extension of Time, October 24, 1995
501-504
Defendant and Counterclaimant's Motion
for Extension of Time to Provide Expert
Witnesses, October 24, 1995
499-500
Affidavit of Evan Roller, October 11, 1995
481-496
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Counter-Motion
for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Defendant's Counterclaim, October 11, 1995
456-480
Response to Motion to Publish Deposition, October 9, 1995
454
Defendant's Response Opposing Partial Summary
Judgment, September 22, 1995
442-444
Partial Summary Judgment, September 25, 1995
439-441
Order to Publish Evan O. Roller's Answers to
Interrogatories with Exhibits, September 13, 1995
422-423
Ray Malouf letter to First District Court Clerk,
August 21, 1995
Not in Record
Objection to Form of Partial Summary Judgment
and Motion for Hearing, September 11, 1995
412-413
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS

1.

Affidavit of Evan Koller, August 18, 1995
(Opposing Summary Judgment, $99,335.52 was paid; specific
failures to do certain legal work.)

R 200-231

2.

Exhibits A through E to Affidavit and Memorandum,
August 18, 1995
R 175-199
A.
Summons (October 14, 1992, issued late)
R 176
B.
Plaintiffs Interrogatory Answers, November 8, 1993
admitting only $79,933.31 received
R 177-183
C.
Letter from Defendant's attorney December 7, 1994,
informal discovery continuing
R 185
D.
Letters from Koller to Preston
September 23, 1990
R 187
June 7, 1991
R 189
August 13, 1991
R 194
E.
Letter from Plaintiffs attorney September 1, 1992
("all of the billings")
R 199

3.

Partial Transcript August 29, 1996
(Judge did not read affidavits)

4.
5.

6.

7.

R 807-809, 825-828

September 25, 1995 Order, ("fully" prepared with
"final" opinions was added)

R 439-440

Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavit for Extension of Time
to Provide Expert Witness, October 24, 1995
(could not fully prepare, despite diligent efforts)

R 499-508

Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel, December 14, 1995
(Duty of care probably not met in specific matters. "It appears
Preston made some mistakes...")

R 587-594

Memorandum Decisions,
November 22, 1995
February 5, 1996
February 21, 1996

R 563-566
R 676-677
R 679-680
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See also exhibits in Docketing Statement with Supreme Court case 96-162. See also the full
Record in this case:
Volume 1
Volume 2
Volume 3
Transcript August 29, 1995
Deposition of Evan Koller, May 10, 1993
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1-231
232-533
534-806
807-829
830-end
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, PC.,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant
vs.

) AFFIDAVIT OF EVAN KOLLER
) (AUGUST 18, 1995)
)
)
)

EVAN O. KOLLER,
) Case No. 930000019
Defendant and Counterclaimant. ) Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
Comes now the Defendant, Evan 0. Roller, and states the
following of his own personal knowledge:
1.

I am the Defendant and Counterclaimant in this action.

To the extent work was done for Roller Corporation, I was
President of that corporation.
2.

Plaintiff and his lawfirm represented Roller in a

number of matters, beginning about November 1, 1979 and
continuing (as Plaintiff alleged and I admitted) through July 20,
1988.
3.

I am competent to testify about the facts in dispute

between Roller and others, what Roller asked Plaintiff and George
Preston to do, what I saw and heard Plaintiff do, the billings
Roller has received, the money Roller has paid the Plaintiff, and
mistakes Plaintiff and Roller made that I observed.

-rt-w
Addendum 1
Affidavit of Evan Koller Opposing Summary Judgment

. R 200-231

4.

In Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory No. 3 of

Defendant's First Set Of Interrogatories, which asked how much
Roller had paid Plaintiff from and after November 1, 1979, Mr.
Preston specified payments between March 1981 and June 28, 1990,
the total of which was $79,933.31.
5.

Roller records from the date of November 1, 1979

onward, the date after which I asked for Plaintiff's accounting,
show Roller has paid Plaintiff $97,335.52.

The difference is

still $17,402.21 in Roller's favor.
6.

The amount of provable Roller payments in excess of

Plaintiff's admitted receipts exceeds the principal amount asked
for by the Complaint, $5,732.43, by $11,669.78.

Without further

accounting analysis, Roller is due a refund.
7.

I do not have all of the billing records.

Plaintiff

furnished Roller copies of what attorney Tom Willmore said were
all of the billings in 1992 when this lawsuit began.

Plaintiff's

attorney (Tom Willmore) argued these billings somehow were
justification for Plaintiff's claim.

The bills did not make

sense to me, so I looked at them closely, more closely than when
Plaintiff firm still represented me.
8.

From the billing copies that were furnished, I can

demonstrate that some of Plaintiff's billings asked a second time
for some moneys Roller had already paid.

My sworn Answers to

Interrogatories explain many of these details.

The billings

furnished were not a complete record of Roller payments.
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9.

On some last-minute billings, Plaintiff transferred

payments Roller made for certain accounts and bills between
accounts and bills without Roller permission and without an
adequate explanation.

These transfers were not agreed to and

appear to me to be negligent or intentional efforts to get Roller
to pay the Plaintiff more than it was entitled.
10.

December 7, 1994, through counsel, Roller asked to look

through the files Plaintiff has remaining, and also asked for a
comprehensive list of those files.

(Please see a copy of the

letter my counsel wrote to Plaintiff's counsel dated December 7,
1994 in Exhibit C, attached to the Memorandum.)

I believe such

files will contain more information that will support Roller
claims of billing malpractice, accounting errors, and legal
malpractice.
11.

Roller trusted and relied on Plaintiff to make accurate

billings and to apply appropriate credits, just as Roller
initially relied on Plaintiff's legal advice.

After I made a

payment to Mr. Preston October 3, 1989, which I understood at the
time to be a complete ,settlement of all current and past claims
for fees, but which^subsequently rejected, I learned not to trust
the billings and am very concerned about Plaintiff's acts as
reflected by billing changes and discrepancies.
12.

One example of double-billing and over-billing by the

Plaintiff is from the Buttars case, designated on the billings as
"ROL204-05M.

Before beginning this case, Mr. Preston told me he

was not licensed to practice in Idaho, but could do so if an
3

Idaho attorney sat in on the case.

I told him I did not want to

pay for him and an Idaho attorney.

Mr. Preston told me he would

work that out with the other attorney and adjust their billings,
so Roller would not have to pay for two attorneys.

The Plaintiff

sent me a letter dated July 29, 1982, in which he stated:
Our computer is just getting our billings out and by
error it billed you too much. Our bill is $3,037.44
and Randall Budge's bill is $1,162, totalling
$4,199.44. You are refunded $1,160.56. We have paid
Randy Budge's bill to date. Thank you.
Mr. Budge was the Idaho attorney.

A hand-written note on the

bottom of the page refers to the refund.

Mr. Budge wrote Mr.

Preston a letter dated August 3, 1982 which said he was returning
the $1,162 to Mr. Preston and, because Roller had already paid
him, directed that $1,162 be refunded to Roller.

Mr. Budge

billed Roller direct for service through June 30, 1982 and was
paid July 28, 1982.

Roller paid Mr. Preston $5,360.

payments by Roller totalled $6,522.

These two

Mr. Preston sent $1,162 to

Mr. Budge, which was returned to Mr. Preston.

Mr. Preston as is

apparent from his 29 July letter, returned $1,160.56 to Roller.
Roller, therefore, paid a net amount of $4,199.44 to Mr. Preston.
However, Mr. Preston's bill was only $3,037.44, according to this
letter.

Subtracting $3,037.44 from $4,199.44 leaves another

$1,162 that Roller overpaid Plaintiff.

This is over and above

the $1,160.5 6 Plaintiff apparently returned to me; and over and
above the $1,162 I paid Mr. Budge directly.
13.

I attached copies of documents relating to the Buttars

facts to my answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories
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and Second Request for Production of Documents, signed September
29, 1993.

Although Plaintiff attached copies of my answers to

its motion, it did not attach any exhibits, including these
referred to from the Buttars case billings.

The court should

take notice of all my sworn Answers and the exhibits.

But, to

continue.
14.

July 28, 1982 I wrote Check No. 2947 to the Plaintiff

for $5,360 for attorney fees.
1982 for client code

I have a billing dated July 19,

tf

ROL204-01" ("General work").

To me, the

July 29, 1982 letter from Plaintiff affirms this billing was for
work on the Buttars case.

Plaintiff did not give Roller a credit

for the $1,162 over-payment.
15.

Besides not giving Roller a credit for the $1,162

overpayment, in answering Defendant's Interrogatory No. 3, Mr.
Preston (see paragraph 4, herein and Exhibit B to Memorandum)
does not admit getting this July 28 payment of $5,360.
Plaintiff refer to the amounts $3,037.44 or $1,162.

Nor does

Roller is

entitled, by just this one example, to an additional credit from
Plaintiff of at least $5,360, less the $1,160.56 apparently sent
back or $4,199.44.

This is part of the $17,402.21 referred to

above in paragraph 5.
16.

Work and the billings on another matter, the 3/4-inch

Tap Appeal, billed as

lf

ROL204-10!,, contains good examples of the

Plaintiff's malpractice.
Civil No. 18267.

This case started in Cache County as

Trial was February 17, 1983.

In asking

questions of Dee C. Hansen, Mr. Preston tried to limit the deeded
5

Roller water right to only enough gallons per mintue to supply
one home.

This would have done violence to the use of the water

reserved to Roller by contract and the October 11, 1968 deed from
Emma Marie Dobbs granting Roller:
"Any and all water or water rights belonging
to, or used on or in connection with, or in
any way appertaining to all of the above
tracts of land in this Warranty Deed however
evidenced.,f
He tried to reduce our right to an irrigation right, which
Cornish could have subsequently condemned for a higher use.
Towards the conclusion of Mr. Preston's questions trying to
establish this with Dee Hansen, the following exchange is taken
from the transcript of testimony of Dee C. Hansen, Civil No.
18267, February 17, 1983 pl8-19, 22-23, 38:
Q (by Mr. Preston) You've never found a deed where
Emma Pearson (Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs, known as Marie,
she was the daughter of Emma Pearson) conveyed to
anyone but Evan Roller.
A

No.

Q And you've never found a deed where Emma Pearson
conveyed her interest to the city?
A

No.

Q And in the deed from Emma Pearson to Evan Roller,
water rights were in fact conveyed, were they not?
A

Yes.

Q

Have you visited this particular spring area?

A

No, I haven't.

Q You've heard Mr. Mike Turnipseed testify that he has
in fact visited the spring area?
A

Yes.
6

Q And on various occasions the entire flow of this
water is directed down the Cornish pipe?
Mr. Fillmore: Excuse me, George, you're saying
the entire flow.
Mr. Preston:
the pipe.
Mr. Fillmore:

Of the spring area is directed down
Is that in evidence?

A I didn't hear Mike testify to that. If he did he
did it in error, because it doesn't all flow down the
pipe.
Q

Some of it flows down the hollow?

A

Right.

Q And have you determined the amount that flows down
the hollow?
A

I haven't.

Q Any amount that would flow down the hollow and not
into the pipe, that would, of course—Butler Hollow
ultimately flows to the Roller property?
A

Yes . . .

Q So what was retained then by Emma Pearson, and there
was a house constructed down there at that time, what
was retained by Emma Pearson would have been what? The
one fifth interest in what type of rights?
A

Well, Emma Pearson was the mother.

Q I don't mean Emma, I mean Emma Marie Dobbs, I'm
sorry. I'm talking about—we will call her Marie
Dobbs.
A

If you don't get confused, I will.

Q Yeah. Her name is Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs.
let's go on that. The type of water rights not
conveyed by Marie Pearson Dobbs was what?

Okay,

A Would have been one-fifth interest in the Pearson
spring.
Q

Now would that—
7

A

Or the Butler Hollow rights in total.

Q Would that be a summer right or a summer-winter
right as you've indicated here?
A

I think it's both.

Q

Summer and winter diligence claim?

A I think it's a fifth interest of the summer
irrigation right and a fifth interest of whatever
winter rights there was. One-fifth of one family right
perhaps or ten cows or whatever they watered there.
Q You found in your Memorandum Decision that there was
no unappropriated water in that, coming out of Pearson
spring.
A We made that determination on Butler Hollow in
total. Pearson Spring was part of the system.
Q I'm not concerned—Cornish has no water rights out
of Butler Hollow, the lower hollow springs, do they?
A No, but, see, the rights that make it fully
appropriated are partly made up from Butler Hollow.
The filings owned by Emma. . . .
Q One more question, I think. Do your books and
records reflect an appropriable, a total flow out of
Pearson's Springs in excess of 26 gallons per minute?
A

Yes.

If you take into account Butler Hollow.

Q

No, I don't mean Butler Hollow.

A Well, you have to, because it is part of the total
appropriation system.
Q But you've got me so—Judge, I hope you're
straightened around.
The Court:
Mr. Preston:
The Court:

I've got it all figured out.
Huh?
I've got it all figured out.

Mr. Preston: Well, I'll tell you, I guess that's why
there are judges and lawyers. Judge's are smarter than
lawyers by a whole bunch.
8

17.

I can explain my understanding about Roller water

rights in the deeds between Roller predecessors and others.

I

can also explain how I observed Mr. Preston fail to appreciate
Roller water rights as early as this trial in 1983.
18.

Roller water rights derived from Marie Pearson Dobbs,

who owned one-fifth of the Pearson spring and conveyed to Roller
in 1968 because the Town of Cornish would not accept her terms in
1939.

The other four-fifths in the water were transferred to

Cornish by a Quit Claim Deed March 2, 1938.

The four-fifths

transferred retained the grantor's right to use the water, which
right was prior to the town's.
right to use all the water.
distribute the water.

So grantor's retained the first

The conveyance allowed Cornish to

Rights-of-way were exchanged.

The town

was to provide water to one of the two homes on the property.
The other home was owned by Marie Pearson Dobbs.

The town was to

provide water from the town system for human drinking, culinary,
domestic, and stock watering uses.

The grantors agreed to a 3/4"

service connection at the point where the town delivered the
water.

The grantors required that all water be metered,

evidently to safeguard the one-fifth interest not granted, and to
divide the water among the four-fifths.

These were the contract

rights.
19.

Roller filed on the one-fifth interest which had been

retained by Marie Pearson Dobbs.

Her rights derived from use of

the water since before statehood.

The Town of Cornish filed on

9

the Pearson Spring.

The dispute was who had first rights in the

spring.
20.

The town's right to use the water in the Pearson Spring

was subject to the reserved rights in the contract with the town,
and to the reservation for first use of the water because
Pearson's rights were ahead of the town's rights.
21.

The town accepted the contract at the time.

The Utah

Supreme Court ruled in the first Roller decision that the Town of
Cornish was subject to the terms of the contract.
22.

Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs had obtained title to all

Pearson rights (five-fifths) in the Pearson Spring through
probate of the Pearson estate.

Thus, Roller obtained all the

rights retained by any of the grantors and had the right to first
use of all the water if he needed it, before Cornish could use
the remainder.
23.

Rights to the Griffiths Spring were also an issue.

Cornish became the appropriator of the Griffiths Spring and
obtained a condemnation right for the spring March 2, 1938.
Griffiths rights were acquired by Roller who bought the property
and water rights from Griffiths, allowing Roller to precede the
town's right to Use this water.

The Court Decree November 30,

1988 said Cornish Town "shall deliver to the east fence line of
the spring area herein-above described, a sufficient supply of
water for the culinary and domestic purposes of (Rollers) and for
watering of a small lawn, for the watering of cattle and horses
used and grazed upon the premises. . .".
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24.

Utah has regulations that apply to water systems that

supply water to 15 or more service connections or a certain
number of people.

Cornish Town has more than 60 connections and

has to comply with these regulations.

By chance, Roller happened

to see a copy of the regulations in a health department office
and furnished a copy to attorney George Preston to use in the
water cases.
25.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not lay enough foundation

for the court about State regulations regarding water pressures,
pipe sizes, and quality which apply to any water supplier
supplying water for domestic purposes to more than 15 service
connections.
26.

Before the first 1983 trial, I learned that Cornish

would have a water engineer named Vaughn Hansen testify at trial,
and asked Mr. Preston if it would be a good idea to get an expert
who could testify to the facts in Roller's interest.

Mr. Preston

advised it would be a waste of money, as he could use the town's
expert to serve Roller's interest.

The town's expert testified

erroneously to many material facts, including the State
regulations.

This testimony coupled with Mr. Preston's lacks of

understanding of Roller's deeded and contractual water rights
unnecessarily prolonged the litigation.
27.

After the original 1983 case, Plaintiff failed to

prepare proper and complete Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
Judgment and Decree for Judge Christopherson.

The failure

allowed Cornish to take severe advantage against Roller November
11

15, 1988 in a court hearing that compounded the lawsuit and cost
the Rollers thousands of dollars in unnecessary costs, by
requiring additional hearings and additional appeals over the
issue of where the Koller connection should be and whether the
state regulations applied to water delivered to Cornish.
28.

On February 23, 1983, Judge ChristqgJierson ruled from

the bench that (a) the town had to deliver the water to a 3/4"
tap or service connection located in a box about 50 feet behind
the present Koller home; (b) the quality of the water had to meet
human drinking water standards; and (c) the use of the water was
not limited by gallons per minute, but by the uses for which the
right was reserved in the grant.
29.

A dispute arose as to where the 3/4" tap connection

should be, which was discussed in the brief Cornish submitted to
the Supreme Court in 1985.

The Town of Cornish stated:

The Pearsons knew that the Town of Cornish was
purchasing the spring for the development of a
municipal culinary-quality water system, and it was
that system of which they wanted to be a part. If
Pearsons had wanted their own line connected directly
to the Pearson Spring, they should have made express
provisions for the same. The only fair and reasonable
interpretation of the language of the deed, is that the
town committed to supply Kollers with a 3/4-inch tap
for culinary and domestic water, and the town must
determine how to get that water to them. (Cornish
brief, pp. 12 and 13.)
30.

The Pearson Spring was the only water available to the

homes on the Pearson property at the time and for the next 35
years.

It was the only water they could reserve.

own any other water.

They did not

Nevertheless, the Town of Cornish argued on

page 14 "that the point of the Court's ruling is that it is
12

solely in the town's discretion where that hookup is made, so
long as the water is of culinary and domestic quality".
31.

Mr, Preston failed to clearly place in the judgment,

Order and Decree the trial Court's 1983 ruling regarding water
quality and the location of the 3/4-inch tap.

The result was the

appeal, in which the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's
1988 decision to change the source of supply.

The Supreme Court

did not address the issue of quality, as it was not then an issue
in dispute.

Because of the Plaintiff's failures, the lawsuit is

still not wholly resolved and it turned into an expensive mess.
Only because of negotiations with the Town of Cornish are Rollers
slowly working toward some settlement.

No thanks are due

Plaintiff, because this lawfirm failed to include in final signed
pleadings the three points orally stated October 23, 1983 (see
paragraph 28).
32.

I can testify as to all these things, as I was present,

heard them and have seen the results from the opinions, which are
plain enough to read.
33.

In 1986, on March 17, Cornish sought to condemn Roller

property in order to control the springs.
lawsuit dealt with condemnation.

This second Cornish

This lawsuit should have been

avoided by a proper conclusion of the first one, but was not, for
the reasons stated above.

When Roller resisted the town's

purchase of the land, Cornish said it was imperative it have a
full fee title to the land, which would have included oil,
mineral, hunting, public assets rights, and everything else.
13

U.C.A. §78-34-2 lists purposes for which a fee simple
condemnation taking is allowed.

Protection zones and rights-of-

way for a spring are not among the purposes listed.

For all

other takings, only an easement is reguired.
34.

Utah public drinking water regulations do reguire

protection zones above springs to protect them from concentrated
sources of pollution, such as septic tanks, drain fields, garbage
dumps, pit privies, drain lines, sewer lines, corrals, etc.
Normal cropping or farming operations are not included in the
list.

Rollers have no concentrated sources of pollution above

the springs; therefore, the uses for which the town sought to buy
or condemn the land were not uses authorized by law.
35.

Plaintiff and Mr. Preston failed to research and press

this point of law in defending the condemnation hearing, which
went forth as Cache County case no. 25058.

The transcript from

that case on February 9, 1988, pp. 1-10 supports this conclusion.
If Cornish was not in need of fee title, and not entitled to one,
why was Cornish trying to take a fee title?

As a party to this

action, I believed then and told Mr. Preston that Cornish was
acting in bad faith and/or fraudulently.
argument when it should have been made.

He would not make this
Related condemnation

cases were heard in 1986.
36.

A hearing was held October 8, 1986 concerning the need

for immediate occupancy.

I had to insist Mr. Preston protect

Roller's fee title and only allow an easement.

14

37.

Mr. Preston laid an inadequate foundation to defend

Cornish Town's claim under U.C.A. §78-34-9 for immediate
occupancy.

Only a few defenses can be raised to contest

condemnation. They include fraud, bad faith, misuse of public
funds, and so forth.

Mr. Preston should have known this, as he

was so advised by opposing counsel and the court.

For some

reason, he would not argue those things against Cornish in this
legal setting.

I believe he had conflicts of interest, the

breadth and depth of which have only been partially revealed so
far.
38.

Mr. Preston stated at the end of paragraph 3 of his

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's (Cornish Town's) Motion
to Dismiss that "Plaintiffs (Rollers) did not need to allege
fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion (because Rollers) are
merely attempting to prove that the land to be taken is totally
unsuitable for the use for which it is to be condemned."

Yet,

because the hearing was a question of immediate occupancy, under
§78-34-9, it was important that he allege bad faith by the city
to protect Roller rights, as shown by the following exchange from
the October 8, 1986 transcript, page 38:
Mr. Martineau: It's our burden to make a prima facie
case. I think it is your burden to prove fraud or that
type of thing.
The Court:

That's right.

Mr. Preston: Your honor, for the record, I am not
alleging fraud. Did you say fraud?
Mr. Martineau: That, along with an abuse of discretion
or a waste of public funds is one of the grounds, and
15

that's not an issue here, I don't think. You haven't
pleaded it, and I don't think it is an issue.
Mr. Preston: I wouldn't accuse these gentlemen of
fraud, but I would say that probably they've mistaken
certain elements which I intend to prove.
(October 8, 1986 Tr. Condemnation Hearing, p. 38.)
Two days later, the Judge made these observations:
The Court: In addition, I think there has been some
misconstruing the Court's role under Section §78-34-9,
which is what this is about, a request for occupancy
pending the final determination of the action. And in
so doing our Supreme Court, in quoting other cases and
so forth, has stated that "It may be said to be a
general rule that unless a corporation exercising the
power of imminent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty
of oppression, its discretion in the selection of land
will not be interfered with. The degree of necessity
or the extent to which the property will advance the
public purpose the courts have nothing to do with.
That is not the role of the court. When the use is
public, the necessity or expediency of the
appropriation of the particular property is not subject
of judicial cognizance. The necessity is for the
condemnor and not for the courts to decide, and the
decision of such condemnor is final as long as it acts
reasonably and in good faith."
So that is all I can inquire into. I can't take and
come out of my chair and occupy the town council's
position and say, "I don't like your judgment. I don't
like what you're doing. This is totally a bad way to
go. I would do it some other way." I can't take my
seat and go down there and tell them that and
substitute my position for theirs. That's there
responsibility and I can't interfere with it, and
that's why I say, based on some of the testimony—and I
let in a good deal that went to that issue, that I
think because that was not relevant, and insofar as it
is, I'll not consider it. There were several
objections based on that. (Oct. 10, 1986 Tr. Hearing
for immediate occupancy p. 454, 455).
39.

George Preston had been told by me that there was bad

faith and fraud by the Cornish Town board.
the issue and has not explained why.

He refused to press

Most of the rest of this

Affidavit (at least the next eight pages) details what was or
16

could have been known by Plaintiff, but was not used in Koller
interests.
40.

The acts of fraud committed by Cornish Town or its

counsel include each of these items, which I told or documented
to Mr. Preston:
a.

Using water tests from waters other than the

Pearson and Griffiths Springs to determine nitrate levels in
these two springs.

There were no nitrate tests of these two

springs before 1977, but the town introduced tests prior to that
time as if they were actual tests of these two springs, when in
actuality, other sources of water were used by the town.
b.

Mr. Martineau and the Town of Cornish inferred to

the Court October 8, 1986 that the Pearson and Griffith Springs
were the only sources of water the town had used since 1938, and
had served the town well.

(Tr. p6)

The fact was that the major

sources of Cornish Town's water were the Kofoed Spring, the
Pitcher Drain, and the town well.
c.

The town hid studies by its engineers showing

there were other viable sources of water at less cost:
(1)

Cornish minutes of 7-01-81, page 218A.

These

minutes were sanitized from the town's minutes obtained by Koller
until later in the discovery process in the civil rights action.
Mr. Preston could have obtained them by prompt action early on.
The minutes say that Vaughn Hansen, the town engineer, said the
Kofoed Spring could be developed and supply the whole town with a
supply of good water for $30,000.
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(2)

B.R.A.G. file of 6-09-81, pp. 9-12 contain a

letter from Vaughn Hansen to Mayor Paul McKnight listing the cost
of developing the Rofoed Spring.
(3)

B.R.A.G. file 3-12-85, p. 317, contains a

memo from Bryan Dixon of B.R.A.G. to Lamar Tarbet, Cornish Town
Council regarding original letters from Vaughn Hansen with a map
of the town's water system, stating, "Bruce King (my boss) said
these could be kept confidential if your attorney wishes, so I
BM

would like to keep the copies. . .See you Wednesday.
d.

The town had their engineer do studies

specifically repudiating his previous studies to indicate there
were no other practical sources of water:
(1)

Cornish minutes 6-6-85, pp. 586&7. "Mayor

Buxton read a letter from Mr. George Preston on behalf of his
client. . Mayor Buxton noted that alternative sources of water as
mentioned in the water was (sic) Mr. Roller's idea.

The mayor

did not feel that Mr. Roller was interested in a good substantial
water source for the community.
thinking of himself.

He felt that Mr. Roller was only

It was felt that this letter was both

insulting and intimidating.

The only reason the other water

sources were considered were to fulfill the requirements for a
B.R.A.G. community development block grant.
(2)

Cornish minutes 4-18-84, pp. 447, 459A, is a

study by Vaughn Hansen repudiating his former studies to justify
a B.R.A.G. grant to prosecute and finance lawsuits against
Roller.
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(3)
study:

P. 2, Alternative I of the above-referenced

"Assumes that required protection zones around the

springs can be acquired. . .without cost to Cornish."

This shows

the city intended to steal Roller's property rights without
paying Roller through court procedure.
(4)

B.R.A.G. file 10-01-84, p. 538, contains a

study for Cornish by Bryan Dixon, and on page 2 provides:

"The

chief unanswered question, and the one addressed here, is whether
regulation of the farmer's application of nitrate fertilizer
would be valid exercise of the police power.

If not, the town

would be forced by economic considerations to pursue other
sources of culinary water."
e.

The town and Bryan Dixon of B.R.A.G. falsified

community development block grant applications for federal
grants.

They admit in one application they applied the previous

year to obtain funds for legal fees to enforce an ordinance.
They applied for funding for "reverse osmosis systems" when they
had no intention of installing one.

They said they had no funds

to develop the town's water system, when in fact, they did have
the funds and were hiding them.

Here is the evidence Mr. Preston

should have obtained and used:
(1)

B.R.A.G. file 4-05-84, p. 416.

Cornish

application for a community development block grant (C.D.B.G.)
for 1984:

"In December 1977, the Utah Bureau of Public Water

Supplies began to find nitrate levels in the Griffith Spring
water which exceed the primary maximum contaminate level of 10.0
19

ppm.

By August 1979, the levels in both springs were high enough

that samples from the distribution system exceeded the 10.0 ppm
limit on nitrates.

The problem results from heavy chemical

fertilizing on the farmland above and around the springs, and the
town attempted to regulate the nitrate applications.

The farmer

who owns the land ciround the springs has been unwilling to reduce
his fertilizing and forced the town to begin litigation for
access to the springs, for rights to the water, and to enforce
their set-back ordinances."
(2)

Cornish minutes 7-11-84, p. 473B.

This is a

resolution by the Town Board to target Rollers.
(a)

"The Mayor of Cornish is hereby

authorized to file formal complaint and institute legal
proceedings against Evan O. and Marlene B. Roller to prevent the
application of nitrogen fertilizer to the recharge areas of the
Griffith and Pearson Springs."
(b)

"The Mayor of Cornish is hereby further

authorized to retain and employ such persons whose scientific
knowledge may help to establish that surface applied fertilizer
in the recharge areas of the Griffiths and Pearson Springs is
contaminating with an unusually high nitrate count the water the
Town of Cornish obtains from the Griffith and Pearson Springs for
culinary purposes."
Note:

Roller only farms a fifth of the

drainage area of the Griffiths Spring which has the highest
nitrate problem.

The town did not target those who farm the
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other four-fifths.

It is also evident they did not, as of 7-11-

84, establish what was causing the nitrate in the water.
town had done no studies and ran no tests.

The

Rollers had done

tests, which showed they (Rollers) were taking more nitrogen from
the soil than they were applying.

Rollers7 tests showed Rollers

were not the problem, but the town ignored those tests.
(3)

Cornish minutes 5-2-84, p. 476A.

Mayor Myler

letter to Bruce Ring, written by Bryan Dixon regarding B.R.A.G.
grant and Evan Roller protesting it because their real intent was
to use the funds to finance lawsuits against Evan Roller.

"As

you are aware, we are facing a real health threat in Cornish if
nitrate levels in our spring water are not reduced.

We simply do

not have the financial means to install valves, purchase land,
redevelop Pearson Spring, and install fencing at Griffith Spring,
all at the same time.
afford to do it.
that

We know what we need to do, but we cannot

Therefore, I was very disappointed to learn

Cornish was not funded by the Investment Strategy

Committee.

The landowner who may be the source of the nitrate in

our springs is aggressive and affluent.

He is willing and able

to challenge us in court on practically every move.

It was this

fact, I understand, which persuaded the Investment Strategy
Committee to bypass Cornish's C.D.B.G. request.
avoid litigation if at all possible."

We would like to

The fact is, litigation

was the purpose for which Cornish applied for the funds—to
enforce its ordinance.

It tried to use a court order to keep

Evan Roller from farming his farm.J
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(4)

B.R.A.G. file 1-24-85, p. 448.

B.R.A.G.

attachment to application for Community Development Block Grant,
Item 10, B.R.A.G. file p. 451B.

"The town sought a C.D.B.G. in

1984 to regulate the application of nitrate fertilizer".
f.

The town and Bryan Dixon concealed funds the town

had in order to obtain Federal grants to prosecute its case
against Rollers.
(1)

Cornish tape transcript, 12-05-84, pp. 33-51:

P. 33. "Lamar: The reason I brought it up is, I
am trying to look at what Evan is thinking. Now
he's failed on the Kofoed and Elwood.
And these
other little springs. So what is he going to go
after this year? It's going to be Trenton or he's
going to hook up on to Lewiston. So, we are going
to cut him off at the pass, see.
(Page 41.)

Verl:

With $70,000 in the bank.

Lamar: That's why I said that Bryan. If we have
a bunch of money in the bank, we really don't
qualify for Farmers Loan. We're talking about
poverty.
Bryan: It's interesting. We don't have the
criteria, either, to ask "how much money do you
have in the bank.?"
Lamar:
A.J.:
we?
Bryan:

Really?
We shouldn't have mentioned that, should
I won't say anything.

(Page 42) A.J.: We have only talked about
reverse osmosis really for about the last nine
months very seriously, and we have nursed that
$70,000 because we assumed it was going to take a
big chunk of that to redevelop the Pearson Springs
to meet State health requirements.
(Page 43) Verl: What does it do to our
situation, in your eyes, when we have $70,000?
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Bryan: In my eyes, I've got to ignore it
personally.
g.

Cornish minutes 1-02-85, p. 527.

public meeting for purposes of a B.R.A.G. grant.

The town holds a
It was a

"canned" meeting with a limit of 3 minutes per person.

"Larry

Pitcher said that he agreed that the water should take first
priority and that reverse osmosis be the first thing done to
deliver potable water.

Mayor Buxton said that the council was

considering both reverse osmosis and some plumbing at the
chlorinator house."
(1)

Cornish minutes 1-02-85, p. 533.

At a

Cornish public meeting the town council voted, "Mr. Simmonds
moved that the Mayor be authorized to apply for a C.D.B.G. to
install reverse osmosis in the homes of Cornish. . .all members
of the council voted in the affirmative."
(2)

B.R.A.G. file 1-24-85.

B.R.A.G. attachment

to application for a Community Development Block Grant, Item 10,
B.R.A.G. file P.451B.

"The town has investigated reverse osmosis

and obtained several bids.

This solution does not involve the

farmer, and he would be unable to delay its implementation
through legal challenges."
(3)

Cornish minutes 2-28-85, p. 550. Bruce King,

Executive Director of B.R.A.G., letter to Mayor Buxton:

"On

behalf of the B.R.A.G. Investment Strategy Committee, it is my
pleasure to notify you that your project, water system
improvements (reverse osmosis), has been recommended for a
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$43,000 Community Development Block Grant for fiscal year 1985.
Once again, our congratulations!"
(4)

Town council executive session 12-5-84, p.

48:
Bob:

Now aren't we using this reverse osmosis as

just a delaying period until we can get the springs and get them
cleared up and redeveloped?
Ann:

Urn Huh,

(5) After the award of the grant, the town
switched the project from reverse osmosis to a condemnation
action against Roller.

Thus, Cornish obtained funds by deceit to

accomplish its purposes in a lawsuit against Roller.
41.

In 1990, Evan Roller convinced a new mayor to examine

the Pearson Spring and redevelop it to eliminate the
contamination with which it was plagued.

With Roller providing

most of the cost, over $30,000 of construction work, the Pearson
Spring has been developed in accordance with State regulations.
The Pearson Spring presently flows about 10 gpm and the Griffith
Spring flows between 2 and 4 gpm.

The town has now received

large grants of funds with which to seek other sources of water.
42.

Given the volume of this documentation of fraud by

Cornish, I could testify that by not raising a fraud claim
against Cornish on my behalf, Plaintiff did not meet an obvious
duty of care to Roller.
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43.

I believe the following items show that the Plaintiff

and George Preston had conflicts of interest which could explain
Mr. Preston's willingness not to be aggressive on my behalf:
a.

Verl Buxton is an officer and stockholder of the

Lewiston State Bank.

The Plaintiff's lawfirm is or has been

affiliated with the Lewiston State Bank as counsel, beginning at
least in the 1930's and continuing in the 1940's, 1950's, and
probably into the present.

V. H. Harris represented Lewiston

State Bank in the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's.

J. M. Chambers

represented Lewiston State Bank in the late 1980's and 1990's.
The Plaintiff firm purchased 50 shares of Lewiston State Bank
stock from a deceased shareholder's estate, some of which is
still held by the lawfirm and some of which is owned by B. H.
Harris.

(See Plaintiff's answer to Defendant's First Set of

Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents,
nos. 10 and 11.)
b.

Plaintiff and Mr. Preston resisted and refused to

pursue the seriousness of Cornish Town's abuse, threats and
defamation by Mr. Buxton, which was directed at Roller, including
allegations by the town council, Mr. Buxton, County Attorney, and
to the newspaper, false allegations that Mr. Roller had
threatened to shoot Mr. Buxton, and threats of violence against
Marlene Roller and Dan Roller in public meetings, including
taking a tape recorder and taking a swing.

None of this was

considered "all that serious11 by Mr. Preston.
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c.

Cornish's attorney Jody Burnett represented George

Preston in a Cache County v. Thatcher case, while Mr. Preston's
law partner, Joseph Chambers, represented Smithfield City against
Thatchers in the sajne case, all according to a July 20, 1989
letter to the Rollers.
d.

Mr. Preston wanted to drop A. J. Simmonds (the

,f

A.J.fl quoted in some minutes above, now the late A.J. Simmonds)

from the civil rights action because Mr. Simmonds had hired
Attorney Gordon Low to represent him, and Mr. Preston said
Simmonds was going to have to pay his attorney fees himself and
he couldn't afford that.

Roller declined, as Mr. Simmonds was

the principal agent of the town in instigating the lawsuits
against Rollers and the ordinance endeavoring to take Roller's
property without compensation.
not a councilman.

He did this as the town recorder,

See A. J. Simmonds, Cornish Minutes Index.

I

believe Mr. Preston and A.J. Simmonds could have been drinking
buddies.
e.

Mr. Preston wanted to drop Bryan Dixon and

B.R.A.G. from the civil rights case.

Bryan Dixon and B.R.A.G.

were principal agents in funding, directing, coordinating,
researching, and^advising the town to take Roller's property by
the police powers without compensation.
director of B.R.A.G. was involved.

Bruce Ring, executive

Mr. Preston has billed

Rollers for one hour for a conference with Bruce Ring.
Preston has represented Mr. Ring in other matters.

Mr.

See June 27,

1985 billing re June 11, 1985 "conference with Bruce Ring—$70".
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44.

Roller had to suggest and insist on discovery, rather

than Mr. Preston instigating very much, if any, discovery.
Initially, Roller lacked understanding and knowledge, and
apparently Mr. Preston also lacked knowledge of certain facets of
the case, including the difference between appropriated and
contract water rights, State regulations regarding municipal
water systems, the usefulness of an expert witness in the water
case, and the facts found in the records of the State Health
Department, Cornish Town, and B.R.A.G.

Important facts from

these records would have helped understand water sources, uses of
the water, tests of water, quality and quantity data, and studies
of the water system.

Mr. Preston was reluctant to comply with

Roller's request to discover the town's records and B.R.A.G.'s
file on Cornish.

His reluctance amounted to abandoning the duty

of care he owed Roller.

His reluctance gave the town ample time

to sanitize its records before Rollers were able to obtain them.
The town did most of its business in executive sessions that hid
many facts regarding the town's water system.
45,

It would have been very helpful early in the water case

to have had the studies by Vaughn Hansen and the minutes of the
town regarding the potential of the Rofoed Spring.

The minutes

of the July 1, 1981 meeting with Vaughn Hansen regarding the
development of the Rofoed Spring were hidden from Rollers until
they were found among other papers produced in discovery in the
civil rights action.

The Hansen studies Rollers were able to

obtain were obtained by Rollers from the B.R.A.G. file when they
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walked in unannounced to the B.R.A.G. offices and asked to see
and copy the file.

B.R.A.G. complied with the request.

The file

was later sanitized, and to this day, Roller has been unable to
obtain a full copy of the town's 1985 C.D.B.G. application.
46.

November 15, 1988, Mr. Preston did not discuss with

Roller a motion he knew about in advance.

Before the hearing,

Mr. Preston and Mr. Burnett had discussed a motion to be made by
Mr. Burnett regarding relocating the 3/4-inch service connection
specified in the contract and deed granted by Pearsons.

Roller

was not advised in advance of Mr. Burnett's intent, but Mr.
Preston admitted the issue had not been brought up in Court but
Mr. Burnett had "passed it by".
47.

The Court and attorneys discussed ?t&& relocating

tap without a specific motion being filed.

the

Unfortunately, the

Judge agreed with Attorney Burnett's argument.

Mr. Preston put

on a weak defense, failed to point out the inconsistencies with
the 1983 bench ruling.

He did not adequately address the fact

that moving the connection up the hill reduced the pressure and
affected flow rates.

The fact that this issue had been fully

adjudicated in 1983 and should not have been an issue between the
parties was not mentioned in the hearing.
1983 was before Judge
48.

The adjudication in

Christopherson.

In his argument, Mr. Preston failed to argue that

Cornish Town acknowledged in its Supreme Court brief that
Pearsons were entitled to a 3/4-inch tap located at their house,
and had deeded to Cornish to participate in a municipal culinary
water system to get better quality but not to change izo location
of the service connection.
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c?37

49.

Mr. Preston did not argue the relation between the

town's water system, State regulations and Roller's water rights.
The point he should have made was that the deed and contract
granted by Pearsons and accepted by the town, required the town
to pipe water to a specified point from the town's system for
grantor's use.

The four-fifths granted to the city had been

subject to the reserved right in Pearsons to use all the water.
The only limitation on the amount of use was for the purposes
stated in the deed, and the amount which would flow through a
3/4" tap or service connection located at the home in which Lars
Pearson lived.

If that tap was moved to another point, it

changed the terms of the contract and did violence to the terms
of the reserved water right.

If the town could move the service

connection to a more distant point, it forces the grantors,
instead of the town, to pipe the water to a location specified by
the deed.
50.

Mr. Preston also failed to argue that water hookups,

taps, or service connections (as they are variously referred to)
are physically located where the water user connects to the line
of the water supplier.

Utah Safe Drinking Water Regulation 1.9

defines a service connection as a means by which a dwelling or
water user obtains water from the supplier's distribution system.
51.

In addition, I pointed out to Mr. Preston that Utah

Safe Drinking Water Regulations 12.7 and 12.7.1 require service
taps to be made so as to not jeopardize the sanitary quality of
the system's water; and that regulation 12.7.2 says that the
portion of the service line urider the control of the water
supplier is considered to be part of the distribution system and
29

"shall comply with all requirements given herein."

Also, that

Regulation 12.7.4 required all facilities connected to a public
water supply to be in conformance with the Utah Plumbing Code.
Mr. Preston's .argument was weak, failed and required a second
appeal to the Supreme Court to enforce what had already been
decided and/^what should have been an obvious argument.
52.

Roller repeatedly asked Mr. Preston to ask for attorney

fees to Roller for having to bring various actions, but Mr.
Preston would not do so.

Prior to the oral arguments before the

Utah Supreme Court on the 3/4-inch Tap Appeal, when Mr. Preston's
brief did not ask for the fees and when reminded of this, Mr.
Preston told me, "the Supreme Court doesn't like to award
attorney fees".
53.

As a result of the telephone conference and hearing

with the attorneys, the present judge, Gordon Low, has used the
fact that the issue of attorney fees was not raised before the
Supreme Court as a reason to dismiss Roller's motion for attorney

Fi sAer
fees.

I was told by Mr. Preston that this telephone conference

and hearing, was to be "only a scheduling conference."
54.

I have been present and involved throughout these

proceedings and can explain historical facts, what I told Mr.
Preston, and what Roller asked Mr. Preston to do.

I believe a

fact-finder can also understand that many of the malpractice
issues are obvious enough that the duty of care can be shown by
the matters referred to in this Affidavit.

The Utah Supreme

Court ruled in its decision that when the trial court granted
Jody Burnett's motion, Mr. Roller's due process rights were
denied.

Mr. Preston was responsible for allowing this to happen,
30

costing Roller many dollars in fees, fees which Mr. Preston did
not ask to be reimbursed in drafting the appeal brief.
55.

Mr. Preston did not meet his duty of care for Roller in

connection with the entry of the Amended Judgment and Decree in
Case 18267, after remand from the Supreme Court.

Amended

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered and all
signed by the Judge December 15, 1988, after a hearing November
15, 1988. The proposed pleadings were served on Mr. Preston
November 30, 1988.

No objection was filed by Mr. Preston until

after the pleadings were signed by the Court December 15. And
then, the objection was filed in the name of Bryan Fisher as if
it were signed by him, but it appears to have actually been
signed by George Preston, December 15. He only had 10 days from
December 1 to file the objection, but filed it December 15, 1988
at 4:32 p.m.

Judge Christc^jpferson signed the Judgment earlier on

December 15, 1988, probably before Preston filed the objection.
Mr. Preston was too late in this filing, yet he billed Roller for
10.75 hours between December 5 and December 15, $860 for this
work.

He later transferred this $860 billing to the 3/4-inch Tap

Appeal account, No. 204-10, October 26, 1989.

The original

billing appeared-: under Client Code ROL204-03 (Civil Rights) on
December 28, 1988.
56.

The signature of

ff

M. Bryan Fisher" on the objection

filed by Mr. Preston December 15, 1988, on page 160 of the Court
record in case 790018267, is distinctly different than "M. Bryan
Fisher" on page 49, which is a pleading that really was signed by
M. Bryan Fisher.

Mr. Preston appears to have been willing to put

another attorney's name on the objection without so indicating it
31
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was not actually signed by Bryan Fisher, file it late, and bill
Roller.
Dated this 18th day of August, 1995,

STATE OF UTAH

)
) s.
COUNTY OF CACHE)
Subscribed and sworn to before
1995, by Evan O. Roller.

EVAN 0. ROLLER

RAYMOND N. MALOUr, J . l
HOWfPUBUC • SVTE OF UTAH
150 EAST 200 NORTH #D
LOGAN, UTAH 84321

COMM. EXP. MAY 21,1996

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August, 1995, a
true .and correct copy of the foregoing, Affidavit of Evan Roller,
was mailed postage prepaid to the following:
Glenn C. Hanni
Peter H. Christensen
Attorney at Law
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

,
Secretary
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EXHIBIT

A

Addendum 2
Exhibits A through E from Koller Respecting Summary Judgment
A.
Summons - late
R 176
B.
Interrogatory Answers, Plaintiff Admits Only $79,933.31
Received
R 177-183
C.
Letter December 7, 1994, informal discovery
R 185
D.
Letters from Koller to Preston
September 23, 1990
R 187
June 7, 1991
R 189
August 13, 1991
R 194
E.
Letter from Plaintiffs attorney September 1, 1992
("all of the billings")
R 199
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IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT CqgSW&F (*&& .-SffATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
fPRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.,
Plaintiff,
vs .
(EVAN 0- KOLLER,
Defendant.

(THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE~NAB£EL-£L
r-KOLLER:
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in
[writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the aboveentitled Court, whose address is 140 North 100 West, Logan, Utah
84321, and to serve upon or mail to OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C., Thomas L.
jWillmore, Plaintiff's attorneys, 56 West Center, P.O. Box 525,
Logan, Utah, 84321, a copy of said Answer, within twenty (20) days
after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment will be taken against you for
the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has been filed with
the Clerk of the said Court and a copy of which is hereto annexed
and herewith served upon you.
DATED this / ^A day of October, 1992.

/lA(^M<A^/^

ON & H O G G A N ,

/Attorneys for Plaintiff
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525
Telephone: 752-1551

P C

ArrowNfrs AT CAW
* * ^CST CENTC*
P O 60X 5 2 5
SAN UTAH 6-*32>O025

t*<2-

Defendant's Address:

<aO«l75i 1551

RONTON

OFFICE:

12693 North 5800 West
Cornish, Utah 84308

123 CAST MAIN
P O bOx I 15
ONION. UTAH & 0 3 7

TLW/koller.sum

\r\X\ K
tXrnoU
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EXHIBIT

B
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Glenn C. Hanni, #A1327
Peter H. Christensen, #5453
STRONG & KANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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IN THE FIRST cj-rvsmx* COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.,
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND FIRST
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.
EVAN 0. KOLLER,
Defendant and
Counterclaimant.

Civil No. 92-690

^

( 3 ~ ®'

)

Plaintiff and counterclaim defendant, Preston & Chambers,
P.C., by and through counsel, hereby responds to defendant and
counterclaimant Evan Koller's First Set of Interrogatories and
First Request for Production of Documents as follows:
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
address

Identify

each name, present mailing

and the inclusive period(s) of association

for every

director and for every shareholder of the plaintiff law firm for
all periods between 1 November 1979 and 1 September 1993.

20462&Y1

ANSWER:

Burton H. Harris, Logan, Utah, 1979-1990; George W.

Preston, Logan, Utah - Garden City, Utah, 1979-Present; Robert W.
Gutke, Logan, Utah, 1979-1986; Thomas L. Willmore, Logan, Utah,
1965-1989; Joseph M. Chambers, Providence, Utah, 1979-Present.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Specify

the name and Present mailing

address of each attorney, named in answer to No. 1, who performed
any service for Evan 0. Koller between 1 November 1979 and 30
November 1990.
ANSWER:

All

of

the

above-mentioned

attorneys, with

the

exception possibly of Robert.W. Gutke, were involved to some extent
with Evan Koller.

It is unlikely that Mr. Gutke participated in

any discussion regarding Evan Roller's matters.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Specify the dates and amounts paid by

Evan 0. Koller or Koller Corporation to the plaintiff and/or any of
its directors or shareholders at any time between 1 November 1979
and

thereafter.

If

any

payments

were

not

deposited

by

the

plaintiff corporation, specify who deposited said payments.
ANSWER:
KOL20403:

204525nh

3-6-81
5-7-81
1-6-82
1-26-83
3-22-83
8-26-83
11-28-83
5-11-84
7-26-84
10-31-84
2-22-85
2

$

10.00
30.00
425.00
20.00
2,371.05
1,200.50
43.22
2,678.50
679.50
120.00
1,030.58
—, , r^C/

'5'r

\lc\

3-6-85
4-8-85
7-5-85
12-10-85
3-11-86
5-9-86
6-12-86
10-23-86
1-6-87
9-27-8"?
6-28-90
Condemnation Case:
10-23-86
KOL20107:
1-6-87
7-3-87
9-22-87
4-4-88
8-31-88
1-5-89
3-8-89
1-6-90

2,346.90
210.57
2,358.98
2,000.00
2,000.00
800.00
810.00
2,500.00
2,500.00
2,000.00
4,133-41

5

S'-nS: &S- "1
2

' 2 8 5 i ° ? „ the account
f r t ' l t « " » collection
3,000.00
15^00.00
294
CK
8 ,000.00 5,000.00
2,312.84
1,486.65
i,-.-.

The Bassett. and White cases were suits brought by our firm
against two trespassers on Evan Koller's land.

The court granted

damages in each case and partial collection was made by our firm
and Evan Koller concluded the collections.
Second Appeal:

Costs were charged.

., ,ft_ This was part
2,687.16
i w h i c h was
of
e
"
^sw
as]
^ J ? between
condemnadiV1
° t n d water appeal
cases an0 Total p a i 2,393.45

S
KOL20110:

3-8-89

10-4-89

1

I

20A628nh
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documents are believed to be on file with the Secretary of State,
with a copy at the law offices of Preston & Chambers.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

Describe in detail to what extent any

member of the plaintiff law firm has ever served as counsel for
Lewiston State Bank, any of its officers or directors, or any of
its major owners.
ANSWER:

George D. Preston represented Lewiston State Bank in

the 1930's, 40's and 50fs. M. C. Harris represented Lewiston State
Bank during World War II and following.

B. H. Harris represented

Lewiston State Bank in the 60 ! s , 70's and 80's.

J. M. Chambers

represented Lewiston State Bank in the late 80 fs and 90 f s.

The

names of all of the officers, directors and major owners of the
bank over the years is unknown and therefore it is impossible for
plaintiff

to

accurately

determine

whether

the

law

firm has

represented these individuals.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11;

Specify whether and to what extent any

member of the plaintiff law firm or members of their immediate
families have ever held stock in the Lewiston State Bank.
ANSWER:

Preston & Chambers purchased 50 shares of Lewiston

State Bank stock from a deceased shareholder's estate.

B. H.

Harris owns some of these shares and Preston & Chambers holds the
remainder.
INTERROGATORY NO, 12:

Specify in detail the nature and extent

of the affiliation, association, or business relationship between
2D462anh
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Verl Buxton and any member of the plaintiff law firm, both past and
present.
ANSWER:

George D. Preston or George w. Preston may have

represented Mr. Buxton in the early 1960's.

There are no known

records that exist as to that representation. Evan Koller was made
aware of this representation early in the lawsuit between Cornish
Town and Evan Koller.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

Specify

in

detail

each

and

every

discussion or correspondence you have had with the defendant
concerning your conflicts of interest in representing the Kollers.
ANSWER:

This question

conflicts of interest.

assumes

that

there

are

in fact

Plaintiff disputes that any conflicts of

interest were created through representation of Evan Koller. It is
plaintiff's belief that its members, specifically George Preston,
were at all times up front and candid with Mr. Koller regarding
clients that they represented.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14:

Identify each person you expect to call

as an expert witness at trial.
(a)

For each such person:

State the subject matter(s) to which the expert is

expected to testify.
(b)

State the substance of the facts and opinions to

which the expert is expected to testify.
(c)

20462&Y1

Summarize the grounds for each opinion.
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Dated this

1
'O#

day of November, 1993.
PRESTO>T & ^CHAMBERS, P.C.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

ss.

LoA&-

On the

.)

^tik day of November, 199 3, personally appeared

Jg

before me GEORGE PRESTON, who duly acknowledged to me that he
signed

and

executed

the

foregoing

Plaintiff's

Answers

to

Defendant's First Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents on behalf of Preston & Chambers, P.C., and that the same
are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and
belief.

'MIA

CttLA&CUK

Notary Public

tCHAMBERS
~ AVE.

ton
A4«7
TL

Dated this

day of November, 1993
STRONG & HANNI

'Glenn^-C. Hanni
Peter H. Christensen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2QAz2Zt\
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MALOUF LAW OFFICE^
150 EAST 200 NORTH, SUITE D
LOGAN, UTAJ3 84321-4036
PHONE (801) 752-9380
FAX
(801) 752-9382

CARL E. MALOUF
RAYMOND N. MALOUF
MICHAEL W. IsBELL

December 7, 1994

Mr. Glenn Hanni
Attorney at Law
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Preston v. Koller

Dear Glenn:
Enclosed are supplemental responses to Interrogatories. In
reviewing for this, I realize a lot of information referred to is
in the documents Koller believes you have. Koller does not think
he should reproduce documents Preston has or that Preston prepared.
Koller believes some of Preston's billings asked a second time for
money already paid.
Reviewing for this supplemental reminded
Koller of just why he was upset at Preston's transfers: He could
not figure out why the bills were made the way Preston made them,
and he still can't. Koller has excellent defenses to Preston's
accounting.
Even if Koller does not choose to use an expert at trial, he
can explain the points he wants to make on eminent domain,
contracts, and the stress related to protracted litigation. Even
if the issues become limited, we will have a few exciting days in
front of a jury.
Since you believe Evan has files Preston wants to see again,
you may want to make an appointment through me to go to Evan's
house after you ask for specific items from specific files and
provide detail of what you wish to see from the files you say
Koller has.
Koller represents the files he took were only the
civil rights files.
Likewise, we request a comprehensive list of the files Preston
has remaining.
We would like the opportunity to look
through
these.
Sineer^iy yours,

Raymond N. Malouf
RNM:by
cc Evan Koller
Tom Willnore, Esq.
drhanglenn.rbl

ns
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EXHIBIT
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EVAN O. ROLLER
P.O. Box 31 Ph.801-563-5467
12693 North 5800 West
Cornish, Utah 84308
September 23, 1990
George W. Preston
Preston & Chambers
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Re:

Supreme Court opinion
Case No. 890020

Dear George:
Thanks for your letter and copies of the recent Supreme Court Decision in Case
No. 890020. Byron Fisher sent us copies also.
It is noteworthy that the Court's opinion was unanimous that the District Court
abused its discretion, erred and failed to safeguard the due process rights of the Rollers. This
is not the only time the Rollers have been abused in that Court. The Court is made up of people
and in the final analysis it is the individuals that participate in the legal process that failed to
safeguard Rollers' rights. It has been very traumatic, frustrating, and expensive for the Rollers.
The Rollers have been injured. Who is responsible?
If you recall, you advised me not to appeal the case. Had we not appealed, the
Town would have then moved to have the conclusions of law and judgement conform to the
findings of fact, the Judge would have seized the opportunity, and Rollers would have been
robbed of their water.
Jody Burnett is always quoting the rules of procedure to the Court. Why wasn't
the rule 52(b) quoted to the Court at the proceeding when the motion was made?
To this date the fact has never been placed before any of the various levels of the
Courts that the deeded contract mandates the location of the tap where the Town is required to
deliver the water for culinary, domestic, human drinking and stockwatering purposes. The
service connection or tap is where the water user connects on to the supply line of the water
supplier. The Judge ruled after taking evidence in the hearing in 1983 that the Town had to
deliver the water to the box behind the Roller home where everything goes out from. The place
where the service connection has always been. It was adjudicated. The Town acknowledged in
Fillmore's brief (red cover) to the Supreme Court that it was the Town's responsibility to deliver
the water to that box behind the home.
It is simply an impossibility for the Town to deliver the water to the Roller home
but require Rollers to connect on somewhere else. The connection is where the water is
delivered.

George Preston
September 23, 1990
Pase -2-

A clear understanding of the water rights and responsibilities of the respective
parties has never been clearly spelled out before the Courts. Because of this the courts are
floundering around in this legal morass. If the attorneys are going to argue water rights cases
before the courts they should understand water rights law. They should also understand State
health regulations if they should apply. If they don't understand the law and regulations they
should direct their clients to someone who does and will effectively argue the law before the
courts.
It was Judge Christofferson who pointed out in 1983 that the Griffiths Spring and
Pearson Spring tap rights were not appropriated rights but were deeded contract rights. He
refused to quantify the flow reserved to the Rollers in gallons as you tried to do but ruled the
use was governed by the reservations and grants in the deeds. He also pointed out that Kollers
were not the appropriators of these two rights but that the Town was the appropriator and owner
of the water. But the deeds reserve to Kollers the use of the water for the enumerated purposes
and the Town must deliver it to them. This fact makes the Town a water supplier and as they
have more than 15 service connections State regulations require the Town's water system to
comply with the regulations for public drinking water systems.
The l/5th right in the Pearson Spring which was never given to Cornish Town is
an appropriated right under the State's laws pertaining to appropriated rights. The fact that
Pearsons required "all" water to be metered—not just that which was delivered to the Pearson
home—shows an effort to safeguard the l/5th interest. The water which was uncollected from
Pearson Spring and flowed down the hollow became a part of the Butler Hollow water rights
belonging to Kollers as pointed out by Dee Hansen, State Water Engineer. The rights pertaining
to the l/5th interest are not the same as those of the contract rights. These rights are spelled out
in the Kimball decree on appropriated water rights. To this day, the Town is still trying to steal
the l/5th interest of Kollers because these rights have not been clearly placed before the Courts.
The water line which Kollers installed up the hill in 1979 and the Town refused
to use or pay for is designed with various outlets to sendee the l/5th interest. The Town must,
as Fillmore argued before the Supreme Court, deliver the water for the tap right to the Koller
home in a separate line.
There were two homes standing on the Pearson property when Kollers bought it.
The Pearsons at one time divided the property up among the respective owners. Kollers still
have two separate rights to the waters of the Pearson Spring and they have no intention of
relinquishing either of those rights because they have used, do now use, and will need to use
them in the future.

George Preston
September 23, 1990
Page -3-

Suppose Kollers want to install a 500 cow dairy as some of the farmers have in
Cornish. Their deed with the Town reserves the right to use the water for stockwatering
purposes. The Town knows this and that is why they want to quantify the amount for some
apartment with two people in it. Vaughn Hansen and Jody Burnett argued .8 gpm would be
sufficient.
The Supreme Court has now vindicated the position that the District Court
committed procedural errors. Who are the individuals responsible?
Why wasn't rule 52(b) quoted before the Court at the time of the motion? Why
wasn't it pointed out to the Court that the Court had previously ruled, and the Town had
acknowledged, the Town had to deliver the water to the box behind the home? Indeed, the deed
requires the Town to -deliver it there. It then becomes impossible for Kollers to receive it
elsewhere. The simple fact remains, all service connections or taps are where the water user
receives the water from the water supplier.
Why wasn't this presented before the Court in five minutes at the time of the
motion instead of going through the gauntlet of appeals? Further, why wasn't it pointed out in
the appeals?
If Jody Burnett and Judge Christofferson (who I understand associates with Jody's
father at the golf course continually) followed improper procedure in this case, who should pay
the costs thereof? I noted Jody's father attended the hearings.
The whole mess has a terrible odor. This case has been festering since back in
the 1970's. In all this time the legal system of Utah has not been able to clearly and concisely
discover and delineate what Rollers' water rights are. Kollers have been injured. They are tired
and disgusted with the whole stinking mess.
If there is anything you can do to recover the costs from those who caused the
injury please let me know.
Very truly yours,

Evan O. Koller

EVAN O. KOLLER
P.O. Box 31
Ph. 801-563-5467
12693 North 5800 West
Cornish, Utah 84308
June 7, 1991
Attorney George Preston
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Dear George:
It is noted in your hand writing on a billing sent to
Evan 0. Koller on May 31, 1991 that "I am getting to rhe point that
I must take action to collect this account." That is your decision
to make but it may prove to be very unwise. For if you do I will
be forced to file one horrendous malpractice suit in counterclaim.
It is understandable that you may feel you are entitled
to these fees. However, there is generally different sides to an
issue and you ought to take a look at this mess from where Rollers
now stand.
Most of our problems in this case have arisen because of
your lack of knowledge of water law, State regulations relating to
municipal culinary systems, and an undertstanding of rhe nature of
Rollers' water rights. If a complete and correct understanding of
these issues had been placed before the court in the early stages
of this long legal mess it should have been resolved ten years ago.
And it should have avoided most of the time, cost, hashing and
rehashing of the issues before the various courts down through the
years.
Your lack of understanding of Rollers water rights under
appropriated law, contract law, and the nature of the contract deed
granted by several individuals to the Town of Cornish has greatly
complicated the matter and been exploited by the opposition.
Rollers went into this knowing what their rights were but
not knowing or understanding how the law and regulations applied
thereto.
Your advice that the l/5th interest had to flow down
Butler Hollow to preserve the rioht is false. It has mislead us
all.
The fact is, there was not total agreement among the five
individuals owning the Pearson Spring and property which it
serviced. That is evidenced in the contract by the fact Marie did
not and would not sign the deed and Pearsons required ALL water to
be metered. There were two homes on the Pearson property. What if
Marie, or Randolph, or Wesley, or Lawrence had moved into the
second home or had built another home on the property how would
they have divided the water? The Town agreed to pipe the water to
the Lars Pearson home but no further. Any distribution beyond that
point would have been Pearsons'

George Preston
June 7, 1S91
Page - 2 responsibility. Now suppose Marie had wanted to take her water and
her share of the property and separate it from the rest
how would
they divide the water and protect the respective rights? How could
Pearsons assure that the Town delivered the l/5th interest not
granted? That is why the requirement was placed in the deed that
ALL water was to be metered whether going to the Town or each of
the Pearsons.
That l/5th interest flowed down both the pipeline
and the Butler Hollow as all the water in the hollow was not
collected. There is still water in that hollow today that is not
.collected.
Pearsons reserved the right to USE the water of the
4/5ths granted "of ONE certain unnamed spring" collected by the
Town's system. They retained the water rights to all other water
in the hollow and did use it until 1959 when Kollers bought it from
Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs. It has been used to this day. The fact
is, the spring produced so little water it was found Pearsons could
draw it all and for various reasons the need for meters became
moot. None were ever installed. The Town got all the water when
Pearsons, or now Kollers, were not using it and it has been
beneficial to the Town along with reservoir sites and r-o-w's.
However, the amount of water supplied to the Town from the
Griffiths and Pearson Springs was generally very inadequate and
other sources of water were sought and introduced to supply the
Town's needs. The Kofoed Spring, the Pitcher drains and the wells
the Town drilled all provided more water each than the Griffiths
and Pearson Springs combined.
The above information should have been discovered and
kept before the Courts from the outset of this case. Instead the
Town was allowed to convince the courts that the two little springs
on the Koller property were the sole sources of their water and
Kollers were trying to steal it from them.
It was not until
Kollers finally convinced you to help obtain the Town's records
that the truth of the matter was revealed. Do you remember asking
the Kollers why they wanted the Town's records? or Brag's records?
or the the States water records?
It was from those records that
Kollers finally proved the earliest water tests the Town was using
to show Kollers were causing high nitrate levels in the Pearson and
Griffiths Springs were not tests of the those two springs but of
other waters.
Further, Dee Hansen, State Water Engineer ruled in his
Memorandum Decision early in the case that all the uncollected
waters of the Pearson Spring or Butler Hollow area flowed down
Butler Hollow and became part of Kollers' Butler Hollow rights
under filing W.U.C. 6716. That is still the case.
Contract water is not governed by appropriated law and is
not lost by non-use as appropriated water is. You will note that
the right to use the water of the Griffiths Spring is not filed on
by Kollers but is a decreed right in a deed from a Court
Georae Preston

/

June /, 19S1
Page -3condemnation
case.
You
will
also
note,
as
did
Judge
Christofferson, that 4/5ths of the Pearson Spring was given to
Cornish by 4 of the 5 Pearsons and Cornish is the appropriatcr of
that water. The grantors of the contract deed reserved the right
to USE that water and the Town agreed to deliver the water to the
heme Lars Pearson was living in at the time. The right to use the
water the four Pearsons deeded to Cornish is "the same situation as
the Griffiths Spring" Judge Chistofferson ruled and also is not
filed on by Kollers. It is a deeded contract right governed by the
terms of the contract.
It is appropriated by the Town from the
State and delivered to Kollers under contract out of the Town's
municipal system.
It is regulated by State and National public
drinking water regulations as it is owned by the Town and delivered
by the Town out of a public water system. Why you did not delve
into this back in 1979 when you, the Kollers, the Cornish Town
Board, the County Health Department and the State Health Department
met regarding the issues of this case, you will have to explain.
You will recall the Kollers had found the Town delivering raw ditch
water to the users of the system in 1978. To this day you have
never placed before the courts the Public Drinking Water
Regulations and their relation to the Koller water rights. Even
after I had by chance discovered there were such regulations,
researched them and provided you a copy with the researched
citations.
It was Judge Christofferson who stopped you from
quantifying and limiting by gallons the amount of water Kollers
could use. Apparently you were going to limit it to one individual
family or home.
How much would you have given each to Lars,
Randolph, Wesley, Lawrence and Marie? Would they all had to have
lived in the house Lars Pearson was living in to have received any
water? How much did you want to limit Kollers to? What criteria
were you going to -cse?
Your lack of understanding of the nature of a service
connection, or service tap, or service hookup and failure to
explain this to the court led to the necessity of the appeal on the
issue. Why did you not explain to the Court that service taps,
connections or hook-ups are where the water user connects to, taps
into, or hooks up to the distribution system of the supplier?
And
from that point downstream it is the responsibility of the water
user but from that point upstream it is the responsibility of the
water supplier and must meet the requirements of the State of Utah
Public Drinking Water Regulations?
Section 1.9 of those
regulations defines a Service Connection as "The means by vmich a
dwelling, commercial or industrial establishment, or other water
user obtains water from the supplier's distribution system.
Multiple dwelling units such as condominiums or aprartments, shall
be considered to have multiple connections,
Each unit in these
dwellings shall be
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12.0.1 on pressures and 12.7.1-4 on service connections and
distribution line sizing. The regs require the water supplier to
comply with certain criteria including quality.
I gave you this
information. It should have been placed before the courts at the
outset of this issue because it is substantially germane.
The "LAW STUDENT ASSISTANCE RULE" approved by the Utah
Supreme Court, September, 1977 and amended April 1, 1986 provides
that law student assistance to law firms is authorized. However,
Section II (5) of this rule provides that "Such student shall net
receive any compensation or remuneration of any kind for his
services from the client en whose behalf he renders service." Do
you recall how much you billed us for a law student named
Hutchinson?
There is more

some with much greater weight.

The Bar Code under TERMINOLOGY states "Fraud" or
"frudulent" denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and not
merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of
relevant information."
A legal dictionary defines "FRAUD" as:
"intentional
deception resulting in injury to another. Fraud usually consists
of a misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure of a material
fact, or at least misleading conduct, devices or contrivance."
"CONSTRUCTIVE (OR LEGAL) FRAUD comprises all acts, omissions and
concealments involving breach of equitable or legal duty, or trust
and resulting in damage to another.
It is thus fraud that is
presumed from the circumstances, without the need for any actual
proof of intent to defraud."
"EXTRINSIC (OR COLLATERAL) FRAUD
fraud that prevents a party from knowing about his rights or
defenses or having a fair opportunity to present or litigate them
at a trial. It is a ground for equitable relief from a judgment. "
The dictionary goes on and defines FRAUD IN FACT (POSITIVE FRAUD) ,
FRAUD IN LAW, FRAUD IN THE FACTUM, FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT, AND
INTRINSIC FRAUD.
The Town and their agents have sought to deceive in many
instances in this case.
Their whole posture has been one of
deception.
Howbeit,
you refused to allege fraud in the
condemnation hearing and the Court ruled that without fraud the
Court could not interfere with what the Town proposed to do.
Therefore, the Court was not interested in any evidence pertaining
to necessity and became antagonistic to any effort to introduce
such evidence or interfere with the Town's proceeding.
The Bar Code further states, "Reasonably should know,"
when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of
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question." There is no evidence that the lawyers involved in this
case have claimed to have less than reasonable prudence or
competence.
The Utah Supreme Court found that: the action of the First
District Court and the Motion of Attorney Burnett: deprived the
Kollers of "Due Process".
Kollers are entitled to due process
under the Constitution and there is considerable federal civil
rights law on the subject. There is also precedent where judges
are not immune.
Utah code 78-51-31 provides for an action against an
attorney who attempts to deceive a Court and they are liable to the
injured in the amount of treble damages.
I would propose to you that we not fight among ourselves
but that we join in cooperation in obtaining fees, costs and
damages from those who have caused this action by trying to steal
Kollers' property and water rights. It is my opinion it will be
much more productive than fighting between us.
Think about it and let me know what you want to do. Due
to the many rain storms we are behind in our farm work and are busy
right now trying to get our planting and farming done but would
discuss it with you as soon as scheduling will permit.
Sincerely yours,

Evan 0. Koller

EVAN O. ROLLER
P.O. Box 31
Ph. 801-563-5467
12693 North 5800 West
Cornish, Utah 84308
August 13, 1991
Attorney George Preston
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Dear George:
Thanks for sending a copy of the Utah Supreme Court
Opinion filed August 1, 1991 in the Condemnation case.
It is
Kollers view that the Court has sustained the strategy of the
Town's counsel completely. However, it is not surprising in light
of the record and past judgments of the Utah Supreme Court.
It does not evidence that Kollers have received the
benefit of qualified counsel acting in their behalf. The reverse
is true.
Utah law, UCA 78-34-4,
(2), provides that "Before
property can be taken it must appear: That the taking is necessary
to such use;." There are weasel words by the Utah Supreme Court in
the Fuller Case, which was also tried before Judge Christofferson,
which weasel words negate the effect of the above statute unless
bad faith is involved. Judge Christofferson emphasized this ruling
to you several times as did the opposing counsel at the trial for
immeadiate occupancy. It is in the transcript. You gave me a copy
of the Fuller Case as reported in 603 Pacific Reporter, 2d, p. 817.
It states, "...the necessity is for the condemnor and not for the
courts to decide, and the decision of such condemnor is final as
long as it acts reasonably and in good faith."
The issues on which the condemnation could be contested
were spelled out to you by the Court and opposing counsel but you
refused to use these issues. The case you put on had no grounds,
there was no foundation, and because of a lack of basis for your
argument opposing counsel had a continuing objection to all
evidence we put on as being irrelevant and the Court ruled in the
opposing counsel's favor. We just as well not even been in Court.
In fact, the record reveals:
MR. MARTINEAU:
IT'S OUR BURDEN TO MAKE A PRIMA FACIE
CASS.
I THINK IT'S YOUR BURDEN TO PROVE FRAUD OR THAT TYPE OF
THING.
THE COURT:

THAT'S RIGHT.

MR. PRESTON:
YOUR HONOR,
ALLEGING FRAUD. DID YOU SAY FRAUD?

FOR

THE

RECORD

I'M

NOT

MR. MARTINEAU:
THAT, ALONG WITH AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR
A WASTE OF PUBLIC FUNDS IS ONE OF THE GROUNDS, AND THAT'S NOT

i cm
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THINK IT IS AN ISSUE.
MR. PRESTON:
FRAUD...

I

YOU HAVEN'T PLEADED IT AND I DON'T

WOULDN'T

ACCUSE

THESE

GENTLEMAN

OF

If you remember, I disputed your argument of no fraud, no
bad faith and not being arbitrary. I had given you a copy of State
regulations pertaining to municipal culinary water systems. The
State regs require a 25 year history of flows to be considered in
the development of sources of water and the low flow of the period
to be used as the criteria in determining the the validity of the
source as a viable source. To this date the attorneys for Rollers
have utterly failed to place before the Courts the regulations
regarding municipal culinary water systems. Because you failed to
lay this foundation the Judge would not hear the flow data I
provided you from the Town's records.
The Judge ruled it
irrelevant.
-Additionally, the State Regs define where the service
connection or tap, or hook-up is located. You utterly failed to
provide this information to the Court when the illegal motion was
presented by Mr. Eurnett to the Court to move the location of the
Hollers' 3/4 inch service tap. As I told you at the time, all the
legal jargon you attorneys were embarking on was frivolous and only
served to generate fees. The self-evident, physical fact is, the
service connection or tap of the water user is where the water user
connects to the line of the water supplier.
The deeded contract Kollers have with the Town requires
the Town to deliver water for human drinking purposes to Kollers at
a specified location where the 3/4 inch service conncticn has
always been located.
The Town from the start of this long,
expensive, legal journey has sought to dishonor that contract in
BAD FAITH. You were invloved from the start and were well aware of
this fact bur you have failed to plead the issue in this case.
Further, there is fraud.
The Town, their engineer and
their Counsel has repeatedly sought to deceive the Courts, the
State Health Department and all of us by using false data to show
there was no nitrate in the Griffiths and Pearson Springs prior to
1977 when Evan Koller moved to Cornish and suddenly contaminated
those springs with nitrate.
The fact is, uhere were no nitrate
tests made of those springs prior to 1977. Kollers had farmed the
area around the Pearson Spring since the mid 1940's and the
Griffiths Spring since about 1970. You were given this info but
you failed to use i":.
There was and is a mountain of information showing fraud,
bad faith, arbitrariness, violation of regulations and
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foundation for any action under these issues.
And we have lost it badly, George.
Maybe the legal
system has won a bunch but the Kollers and Cornish Town have lost
it badly.
There is an issue you may want to get your teeth into or
be interested in. I have tried to point it out to Byron Fisher but
have had no response on rhe issue. It is as follows:
I have a question regarding the queston of abandonment and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of U.C.A. 78-34-2 which provides for
"Estates and rights that may be taken."
U.C.A. 78-34-2, (1) lists
the purposes for which fee simple may be taken and then qualifies
those purposes if there is mineral underlying the area to an
easement only. A protection zone is not one of these purposes.
U.C.A. 78-34-2, (2) states, "An easement, when taken for any other
use." A protection zone fits into this classification-.
The Town by letter to Mr. Koller stated in was "imperitive" that
they have "fee simple" title to all the property they were taking.
The fact is the Town was asking fee simple on all the property they
were taking, r-o-w's and all, but the District Court pointed out
they could not take fee simple to the r-o-w's but was going to
allow it on the protection zones. At the end of the Occupancy
Hearing when I prompted you to ask about oil rights and mineral
rights Burnett stated that they needed fee simple and could not
have oil rigs or such things on the property.
The fact is the statute does not provide for the taking of
protection zones in fee simple.
Period!
So they amended their
complaint and asked for an easement only. Either they needed fee
simple or they didn't.
If they didn't they were acting in "bad
faith" by seeking complete ownership of the property for purposes
other than a protection zone.
You should have caught this and
explicted it at the hearing on occupancy. But you didn't and they
were granted occupancy.
Correspondence was introduced at trial showing Mr. Koller had asked
the Town what rights they needed in the property and they had
replied by letter it was "imperative" they have all rights or "fee
simple". The Town was then confronted with a proffer of proof of
minerals underlying the property.
The Town then abondoned their
need for fee simple and the need to restrict Kollers to steep,
inaccessible, unuseable r-o-w's across the property and amended
their complaint to needing an easement only because that was
provided by statute. The fact is they abandoned
George Preston
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their claim because the law did not allow it to begin with under
any circumstances and. The Court then erred in letting them take
an easement without determining the value of the minerals
underlying the property which minerals they could not afford to
buy.
They did not amend the claim from fee simple to an easement because
the statute concerning minerals provides for an easement only as
the Town or Supreme Court would have us believe. That portion of
the statute does net apply in this case. This should be an issue
for a re-hearing before the Supreme Court or for an appeal from
their opinion. It is my view that the Town totally abandoned their
claimed need position and sought a totally new position which the
State Supreme Court has now ruled is also untennable. We should be
entitled to costs and fees and particulary so if it can be
demonstrated at trial that the Town has to buy the minerals.
The thrust of the legal system at this point, and the Supreme Court
implies it in the final paragraph of the their opinion on minerals,
is that Kollers property rights are inferior to the Town's water
rights. Therefore, there is a question whether Kollers can mine
the mineral because the water rights prohibit such mining.
I
imagine another huge legal bill can be generated for both the Town
and the Kollers over that litigation. The fact is, Kollers have a
record of a patent to their property which makes it allodial and it
predates any rights acquired by the Town to any water by many
decades. But as long as the courts and legal system is giving away
other peoples property and not their own they tend to have a pretty
liberal view.
That is the way I have viewed the action of the
Democratic Party
they are liberal until their personal pocketbook
is pinched and then they are very conservative. It seems to depend
on who's ox is being gored.
There's more but a grain combine and a harvest crew has
been waiting for me.
I still feel the system should be liable for the costs if
they want to play games and cause the proliferation of legal fees.
It seems to me that is only right and you should have been trying
to help us in that regard if you were really qualified counsel
working in our behalf.
You know George, Judges as well as
attorneys can be sued. They are not above the law. It might put
your next case before the Judge in jeopardy if you sue him but that
is not your client's fault
that is one of the things wrong with
the legal system. I don't want to fight with you guys. But you
should know by now that I will fight if I have to. Now you proceed
as seems to you good.
Sincerely yours,
Evan 0. Koller
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Raymond N. Malouf
Malouf & Malouf
Attorneys at Law
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, Utah 84321
Re:

Preston & Chambers v, Evan Koller
Our File No. N-5061

Dear Ray:
I have received from the law firm of Preston & Chambers all of
the billings concerning the various lawsuits when Mr. Preston
represented Mr. and Mrs. Koller. These billings are at my office.
If either you or Mr. Koller want to make arrangements to come
review the billings, you are certainly welcome to.
The other
alternative is that we will provide to you copies of the billings
for 2 0£ per page. There are a lot of billings for each case. The
decision is yours. Please let me know whether you want to review
the billings at my office or receive copies.
Also, I sent to your office on June 22, 1992 an Acceptance of
Service and Entry of Appearance. I have not received from you a
signed original of that document. I have enclosed with this letter
again an Acceptance of Service and Entry of Appearance.
Please
sign the original and return it to my office so that I may file it
with the Court. I have been requested by my clients to conclude
this matter as expeditiously as possible.
Therefore, after you
have signed the Acceptance, please answer the Complaint within
twenty (20) days of the date of your Acceptance or a default
judgment will be taken against Mr. Koller. If I have not received
the Acceptance of Service and Entry of Appearance from you by
September 4, 1992, I will proceed to have the Sheriff serve Mr.
Koller.
Sincerely yours,
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

Thomas
TLW/sgj
malouf.ltr
Enclosure
cc: Preston & Chambers

Willmore
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start

at this p o i n t .

if the attorney

leaves

I'm

all

things, and

this issue doesn't need

5

still

the file at

and read his 32 page a f f i d a v i t , plus

3 | the interrogatory

10

to go through

grant

that.

Has Mr. Willmore

withdrawal?

Page

21

22?

MR. PRESTON:
2

MR. MALOUF:

3

THE COURT:

4
5

He h a s .
He h a s , Your Honor, some months
All r i g h t .

have your response

That will give you

filed on or before

until

September

8th

6

MR. PRESTON:

7

MR. H A N N I :

I'll

8

THE COURT:

Y e s , if you would, Mr. H a n n i .

9

ago

Thank

you.

prepare

an order, Your

Honor.
Thank

you

10
11

(Concluded

at 11:40

a.m.)

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Paae

22
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Glenn C. Hanni, #A1327
Peter H. Christensen, #5453
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.,
Plaintiff and
Counterclaim
Defendant,

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 930000019 CV

vs.
EVAN 0. ROLLER,
Defendant and
Counterclaimant.

>

Judge Ben H. Hadfield

]

The motion of plaintiff for partial summary judgment
on all legal malpractice claims asserted in defendant's counterclaim came on for hearing before the Court on the 29th day of
August, 1995.

Plaintiff was represented by its attorney,

Glenn C. Hanni of the firm of Strong & Hanni.

Defendant was

represented by his attorney, Raymond N. Malouf.

The Court

heard argument of counsel, and it appearing to the Court that
the malpractice claims asserted in the counterclaim will require
expert testimony, and it further appearing that defendant, having
more than ample time to do so, has failed to designate an expert

Addendum 4
September 25, 1995 Order

R 439.440

to address the legal malpractice claims asserted in the
counterclaim, and the Court being fully advised,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintifffs motion for partial summary judgment is

hereby granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant on all legal malpractice claims
asserted in the counterclaim unless the defendant on or before
October 28, 1995, designates an expert witness or witnesses
who will be prepared to express final opinions with respect to
the legal malpractice claims involved in this case, and unless
within said time the expert witness or witnesses are made
available for their depositions to be taken by plaintiff.
2.

The deposition or depositions of defendant's expert

witness or expert witnesses shall be completed within the time
frame stated above.
Dated this

'££~

day of

S^fl.

, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

Ben H. Hadfield,

UqO

Tab 5

f
Raymond N. Malouf (#2067) d:extwitne.rbp
MALOUF LAW OFFICE
Attorneys for Defendant
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321-4036
Telephone (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant
vs.

)
)
)
)

DEFENDANT AND
COUNTERCLAIMANTS MOTION
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
PROVIDE EXPERT WITNESSES

) Case No. 930000019
EVAN O. ROLLER,
Defendant and Counterclaimant. ) Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
COMES NOW the Defendant and Counterclaimant, Evan O. Roller,
through counsel, and moves that the Court Order an extension of
time beyond October 28, 1995 to designate an expert witness or
expert witnesses who will be prepared to express opinions
regarding legal malpractice claims stated in the Counterclaim.
Defendant moves that the Court enter an Ex Parte Order for a
temporary extension until such time as this Motion is heard.
This Motion is supported by the pleadings in the file, made
after the matter was heard in argument August 29, 19 95, which
have been numerous.

It is also supported by the Memorandum

submitted herewith and Affidavits.
DATED this 24th day of October, 1995.

Addendum 5
Extension of Time Motion
Memorandum

R 499
R 501

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 1995, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing, Defendant and
Counterclaimant's Motion for Extension of Time to Provide Expert
Witnesses, was mail€>d postage prepaid to the following:
Glenn C, Hanni
Peter H. Christensen
Attorney at Law
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Secretary

JfJ
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Raymond N. Malouf (#2067) d:extmemor.rbp
MALOUF LAW OFFICE

s

to <-

Attorneys for Defendant
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321-4036
Telephone (801) 752-9380
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME

EVAN O. KOLLER,
Defendant and Counterclaimant

Case No. 930000019
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield

Defendant and Counterclaimant, Evan Roller filed a Motion
for an Extension of Time to provide an expert or experts with
opinions respecting the allegations of malpractice against
Plaintiff George Preston.

In support of this Motion, Defendant

provides the following Memorandum:
PLEADINGS FILED AFTER AUGUST 29, 1995
The pleadings filed after this matter was heard August 29,
1995 show that there are more issues to be resolved by the Court
than the Court had before it August 29.

On August 29, the Court

only considered the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment against Defendant's malpractice claims.

Now the Court

has pending, and to be heard, Defendant's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff's accounting and also
respecting the jurisdiction of the Court on the Complaint.

In

addition, the Plaintiff filed the third Motion for Partial

OCT 25

wf^i

is progressing as fast as reasonable—but it cannot be ready by
October 28.
In addition, the Defendant is consulting with an accounting
firm to review Plaintiff billings.

Their opinions are similarly

not formed yet because of the necessity of imputing data.
It is reasonable and equitable that the Defendant be allowed
an extension of time because of progress made in order to provide
experts.
OUTSTANDING DISCOVERY
As the Court may recall, the Court has yet to have a PreTrial Conference to enter a discovery cut-off date.

After August

29, Roller submitted his Second Interrogatories to the Plaintiff.
Answers were just received.

Roller's Third Interrogatories and

Requests for Production of Documents were served October 9, 1995.
Answers are not yet due.

The Third Interrogatories refer to

specific requests for files each party has that the other has not
yet reviewed.
OTHER MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
merits of the accounting is appropriate to dismiss the Complaint.
This is true notwithstanding the recitation of 23 factual issues
referred to in Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Counter-Motion
for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaim, served October 11,
1995.

These facts show that the Defendant is entitled to Partial

Summary Judgment against Plaintiff's initial Complaint because
3

67)2

Defendant paid at least $11,669.78 more than the Complaint.
Defendant is not, however, asking for Partial Summary Judgment on
certain over-charges.

These will increase the amount of

Defendant's overpayment.

The material factual disputes about the

Plaintiff's malpractice are set forth in the afore-referenced
Memorandum on Pages 13 through 24. The Defendant is entitled to
the benefit of the presumption that there are material disputed
facts about which not only an expert can testify, but also the
Defendant himself may testify to the particular events stated in
Evan Roller's October 11, 1995 Affidavit.
CONCLUSION
Granting the Defendant more time to provide experts, given
the status of this case, is fair, equitable, and will be more
legally efficient.

A Temporary Order extending the time should

also be granted.
DATED this 24th day of October, JT9^ST-N

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 1995, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing, Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Extension of Time, was mailed postage prepaid to the
following;
Glenn C. Hanni
Peter H. Christensen
Attorney at Law
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

6"W
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Raymond N. Malouf (#2067) d:kolaffi2.rtp
MALOUF LAW OFFICE
Attorneys for Defendant
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321-4036
Telephone (801) 752-9380
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant
vs.

) AFFIDAVIT OF EVAN O. KOLLER
) (OCTOBER 24, 1995)

) Case No. 930000019
EVAN O. KOLLER,
Defendant and Counterclaimant. ) Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS.

COUNTY OF CACHE)
COMES NOW the Defendant, Evan O. Roller, and states the
following of his own personal knowledge:
1.

I am the Defendant and Counterclaimant in this action.

2.

I have diligently sought to comply with the Court's

order given from the bench on the 29th day of August, 1995 which
order requires experts to testify in this matter.
3.

I called a number of attorneys and auditors in an

effort to find experts who had the time and were qualified in the
particular areas.
4.

Many days have been spent identifying, preparing and

copying documents of the case to take to a number of those
called.

The documents in this case are voluminous.

r,^U 9 5 -

Q\°\

^riin
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5.

At the present time the auditing firm of Pinnock

Robbins Posey & Richins is examining the billing statements of
the Plaintiff.

They have indicated they cannot finish the work

in the time allotted.
6.

The law firm of Nielsen & Senior is examining documents

of the case.

They have indicated they cannot be prepared to

proceed in the time allotted.
7.

The law firm of Jeffrey W. Appel is also examining

documents of the case.

Attorney Appel has indicated he cannot be

prepared to proceed in the time allotted.
8.

The order of the Court came during our harvest season

in which I was engaged from early morning until late at night
until September 29, 1995. After that I had to get the fall wheat
seeded.

In addition there have been field trips with water

rights attorneys in Idaho regarding water right filings.

There

have been field trips with Idaho Fish & Game regarding wildlife
damage.

Field trips and meetings have been required with

geologists who were examining the area.

A canal company called

and needed several days help in breaking and loading old sugar
factory foundations to be used as rip-rap in their system.

In

addition to all this there have been all the day-to-day problems
and people that have to be accommodated or serviced.
have been more than I can cope with.

There is much farm work

that has been abandoned because of a lack of time.
expensive for us.

2

The demands

It will be

9.

I have spent four days in Salt Lake City contacting

experts and working with them to comply with the order of the
Court.

I have been unable to move this any faster.

I will try

and expedite it as fast as I can but the experts are the ones
that will have to indicate when they are, or can be prepared.
10.

In view of the above circumstances, I am compelled to

ask the Court for an extension of time.

It will take time for

the experts to become prepared and it will take time to schedule
and take the depositions.

Without further direction from the

experts, I would suggest a 30 day extension.
DATED this 24th day of October, 1995.

EVAN O. KOLLER
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of October,
1995, by Evan 0. Roller.

J^^K-^CT

MICHELLE F. JA6GI
m m PUBLIC'STATE OF UTM
150 EAST 200 NORTH «
LOGAN, UTAH 84321

COMM. EXP. MAY 7,1997

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of October, 1995, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing, Affidavit of Evan Roller,
was mailed postage prepaid to the following:
Glenn C. Hanni
Peter H. Christensen
Attorney at Law
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Secretary
3

MALOUF LAW OFFICES
1 5 0 EAST 2 0 0 NORTH, SUITE D
LOGAN, UTAH
84321-4036

CARL E. MALOUF
RAYMOND N. MALOUF

PHONE ( 8 0 1 )
FAX
(801)

752-9380
752-9^32

MICHAEL W. IsBELL
DAVID L. COOLEY
Also admitted i n F l o r i d a

October 24, 1995
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
First District Court
140 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84321
Re:

Preston & Chambers v. Roller, #930000019

Dear Judge Hadfield:
Evan Roller is filing a Motion for an extension of time to
provide an expert or experts.
He requests an Ex Parte Order
extending the time beyond October 28 for Evan Roller to designate
an expert witness or witnesses and to have those witnesses
available to express opinion, until the Motion is heard and ruled on
by the Court. The Motion is supported by a Memorandum, as well as
the numerous pleadings filed after this Motion for Summary
Judgment. You also have two more Motions for Summary Judgment
before you which need to be heard.
Instead of one Motion for Summary Judgment before the Court as
was the case August 29, there is also a Motion for Summary Judgment
on behalf of the Defendant for a judgment on the accounting and
dismissing the Complaint. There is a third Motion, filed on behalf
of the Plaintiff, for judgment on account stated. Memoranda are
filed on all these, and the latter two should be set for a hearing.
Resolving the Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's legal
malpractice claims (first Motion) does not resolve the case. A 54b
Order may be needed if all issues cannot be decided. On the other
hand, extending the existing deadline and keeping the case open on
all issues is appropriate, because (a) the progress Defendant is
making in getting an expert or experts despite time problems; (b)
the inter-relationship between malpractice and the billings which
must eventually be heard anyway because the existing Order does not
solve accounting problems; (c) the fact that discovery has not
terminated; and (d) the fact that Defendant still has one
outstanding discovery request. Defendant submitted two discovery
requests after August 29, 1995. The Plaintiff has responded to one
and the other may provide additional information which could be
necessary for an expert's review.
Si^r^rely^ypurs,

1-01I
RNM:by
cc Glenn C. Hannif Esq,
d:kolhadfi.rbl
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Raymond N. Malouf (#2067) d:affappei.rbp
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Defendant
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, Utah 84321-4036
Telephone (801) 752-9380
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant
vs.

) AFFIDAVIT OF
) JEFFREY W. APPEL
)
)
)

EVAN O. KOLLER,
) Case No. 930000019 CV
Defendant and Counterclaimant. ) Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
The undersigned attorney deposes and states the following of
his own personal knowledge:
1.
Utah.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of
A major portion of my practice is devoted to the areas of

water law and litigation.
2.

I have been retained on behalf of Evan O. Koller to

furnish legal opinions concerning certain claims of malpractice
Defendant and Counterclaimant Koller made against Attorney George
W. Preston, the Plaintiff in this action.

The parties will

hereafter be referred to as "Preston" and "Koller".
3.

To date, I have reviewed

certain documentation and

summaries provided to me on behalf of Koller.
4.

The Counterclaim (Paragraph 5) alleged that Preston was

confused about several of the issues, was negligent in-aome^^f^his ,q
Addendum 6
Jeffrey W. Appel Affidavit
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legal

work,

and

to

the

extent

he was, Preston

should

not be

compensated.
5.

Having reviewed certain excerpts

from the 1983

trial

testimony, it appears to me that Preston was confused concerning
the difference between appropriative water rights under State law
and contract rights provided by the Deed to Roller.
Judge appeared to understand the water rights.

However, the
To the extent

Preston failed to prepare pleadings after the trial to place the
location of delivery of water to Roller as found by the Court,
failed to avoid pressing for a gallons-per-minute limitation on the
deeded water right to Roller, and did not differentiate between
appropriated versus contract water rights, Preston did not meet the
duty of care owed to his client.
6.

Roller has specifically alleged that Preston failed to

adequately prepare, complete, and follow-up with proper Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree, in the original 1983
case before

Judge

Christopherson.

To

the extent

the

Court's

statements were not embodied within the written Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment entered by the Trial Court, the
duty of care was not met.
7.

Any

failure

to

include

important

information

in the

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at the Trial Court
level, particularly when the Trial Court appeared to understand
appropriative

water

rights

and

contract

rights,

would

create

ramifications in the first appeal.
8.

Roller

claims

Preston

failed

to adequately

evidence the Utah State Safe Drinking Water Regulations.
opinion that a preferable

strategic
2

put

into

It is my

choice would have been to

advise

the Court

attempt

to

of the existence

convince

the

Court

the

of

these regulations

Town

of

Cornish

in an

had

the

obligation to provide water fit for human drinking purposes to
Roller pursuant to the Deeds.

To the extent Preston failed to put

community drinking regulations into evidence as an obligation of
Cornish, he probably failed in the duty he owed to Roller in that
case.
9.

Time has not permitted me to become fully immersed in all

of the evidence and the transcripts to provide final opinions, so
my use of "probably" is intentional.

There is a genuine concern

about choices made to not present this evidence.

Those choices

appear, now, to be a failure to meet the duty of care owed to the
Rollers.
10.

After the Supreme Court decision in Cache County Case

18267 on July 20, 1988

(No. 19981), it was necessary to prepare

Amended Findings, Conclusions, and a Judgment.

Preston and Roller

apparently disagreed about the amount of detail and the language to
be inserted in the Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment.
Roller is still asserting there are errors and omissions in those
amended documents.
1988.

The Trial Court had a hearing November 15,

The attorney for Cornish City made a motion to change the

location for the 3/4-inch connection to the Roller home.
11.

Roller is asserting that Preston was unprepared November

15, 1988 to convince the Trial Court and respond to the motion to
move the 3/4-inch connection tee to a new location, which had zero
water pressure.

The Trial Court ruled against Mr. Roller on this

motion, necessitating another appeal to the Supreme Court, in which
the Trial Court was reversed.

The Trial Court signed its Order
3

December

15,

1988.

Copies

of

the

town's

Amended

Findings,

Conclusions and Order were mailed to Preston November 30, 1988.
Preston filed written objections to the decision of the Trial
Court, December 15, too late to be timely.

The issue of the water

tap connection location was not part of the first appeal.
12.

To the extent Preston was late in objecting to the Order

of the Trial

Court concerning Cornish City's motion, a fairly

serious problem was created.

From what I understand at this level,

it appears the tap connection issue could have been effectively
cured at the Trial Court level.

The second Utah Supreme Court

opinion (No. 890020, September 19, 1990) corrected the Trial Court.
My preliminary opinion is that Preston failed in the duty of care
he owed to Roller by making the objections late.
13.
against

Roller asked
Cornish

attempting

Town

Preston to file a civil rights
and

its

town

to take Roller property

council

rights by

for

deceptively

falsely

Roller polluted the springs with nitrogen fertilizers.

lawsuit

alleging

Roller was

not happy with the way this case was prosecuted, and it was finally
settled.

Questions about prosecution of this case are more fact

sensitive, and I am not able to express an opinion at this time.
Roller has alleged there were conflicts of interest, an example of
which is that somehow Cornish Town became aware of the imminent
filing of the civil rights suit.

If Roller asked Preston whether

there were conflicts of interest and did not get a complete answer,
or if there were real conflicts, there is a legitimate problem with
failure to disclose conflicts of interest for which there is a duty
of care owed to the client.

I am not yet able to express an

opinion about whether Preston should have pushed earlier and harder
4

for

discovery

of

the

fraudulent

documents

relating

to

the

condemnation of land to secure water issues.
14.
Cornish

Roller alleged Preston failed to appropriately contest
Town's

condemnation

proceeding.

attempted under U.C.A. §78-34-1 et seg.

The

condemnation

was

Roller has asserted that

statute did not allow the taking of protection zones by taking fee
title to real property, and that the failure to allege this in
Court was a failure of the duty of care owed to Roller by Preston.
Roller claims that Roller unnecessarily had to hire a mineral
expert and pay the fees and expenses to assess mineral values, and
to pay Preston's fees for interviewing and becoming knowledgeable
about the mineral value of the property.

Roller claims this could

have been avoided had Preston simply been prepared to argue that
fee title was not available, when the Court had a hearing October
10, 1986.

Roller alleges that it was he, rather than Preston, that

introduced the subject to challenge a taking of all interests in
the property, as opposed to a lesser interest for the protection
zone.
15.

It is quite clear that fee title may not be taken under

U.C.A. §78-34-2 for the purposes sought by Cornish Town.

Preston's

failure to understand and enunciate that defense, to the extent he
did not, was a failure in meeting the duty owed to his client.

It

is my preliminary opinion that proper assertion might have obtained
the desired result much earlier in the proceedings and probably
even during that hearing.

Only later did the town apparently amend

its request and not seek to buy the minerals.
easement only.

It accepted an

To the extent Preston did not raise the issues

Roller requested, it appears the duty to Roller was not met.
5

rrn t

16.

Koller asserted that Preston should have been forthright

in alleging fraud against Cornish Town, but did not do so because
he either did not proceed properly with discovery to bolster the
fraud charge, or because he had conflicts of interest.

I have not

had sufficient time to review materials to determine if Preston had
documents in his possession that would have shown fraud, or if he
should have requested items which would have led to the production
of those documents.

I have seen documents now available that

support Roller's beliefs about Cornish Town fraud.

If Preston had

such documents, he likely could have made a prima

facie

case for

fraud, which would also have shortened proceedings following and in
connection with the October 10, 1986 hearing on condemnation.

To

the extent Koller pointed out matters and Preston ignored him,
Preston would likely not have been meeting his duty of care to
Koller.
17.

Koller has stated he obtained Cornish minutes and other

information

from

the

Bear

River

Association

of

Governments

(B.R.A.G.) file which proves the fraud by Cornish City.
did not directly obtain this information.
B.R.A.G.

offices

to

get

the

file

on

Preston

When Preston went to the
Cornish,

very

unimportant according to Koller) records were found.

few

(and

According to

Koller, when Koller went unannounced to B.R.A.G. offices, Koller
obtained a host of very important documents, but this ended up
being years too late.
1986.

Koller obtained the materials March 28,

The minutes would have been very helpful, according to

Koller, even in the initial trial in 1983.
18.
that

Koller alleges that Preston had conflicts of interest

interfered

with

a

zealous
6

representation

of

the

Rollers

(Paragraph 9 of the Counterclaim) . The conflicts appear to be that
Preston's firm was general counsel for Lewiston State Bank, at
which the Cornish Town mayor Verl Buxton was a major stockholder;
Preston's law firm has stock in the local bank; Preston's firm also
was local counsel

for two other major Utah banks; one of the

councilmen in Cornish was also a client of

Preston; Preston asked

Roller to voluntarily drop Cornish Town officer A.J. Simmonds from
the civil rights lawsuit, even though the Cornish minutes reflected
that A.J. Simmonds encouraged lawsuits against Roller; Cornish City
had

interaction

with

Bear

River

Association

of

Governments

(B.R.A.G.) in the condemnation lawsuit against Roller; the director
of B.R.A.G., Bruce Ring, was apparently a client of Preston; and
Preston asked Roller to drop Bear River Association of Governments
from the related civil rights lawsuit.
19.

These apparent

conflicts of interest would become an

issue of adequate disclosure to the client.
the

ability

to

represent

Roller

was

If Preston felt that

compromised

by

Preston's

friendships or associations with others, the law firm had a duty to
advise

Roller,

discuss

the

representation if necessary.
factually intensive.

matter,

and

offer

to

terminate

The conflict of interest question is

Although it appears there were conflicts, it

could remain for trial and testimony from Preston and Roller to
reveal the amount of disclosure, at the time, on these specific
conflicts, to know whether the duty of care was breached.
CONCLUSION
20.

It

appears

to

me

that

Preston

made

some

mistakes

concerning the condemnation and water rights aspects of the case.
Had

I

been

in

charge

of

this
7

case,

I

would

have

better

differentiated between the appropriative and contract water rights
and likely would have taken the steps to assure the quality of the
water for Roller by apprising the Court of the drinking water
regulations.
21.

Without knowing more about the state of the discovery at

the time, it is difficult
or

misuse

of

to ascertain

public

funds

at

if

the

I would have raised

time

of

the

fraud

condemnation

proceedings by Cornish against Roller.

I would, however, have

reviewed

on

the

statute

and

noticed

early

that

fee

title

is

unavailable to the condemnor under the statute.
22.

With respect

to the conflicts of interest, if

I had

conflicts, I would immediately disclose them to my client and let
him make the decision concerning continued representation.
23.

I am mindful of the advantage to the

"Monday-morning

quarterback" and the benefits of 20-20 hindsight.

However, there

seem to have been lapses of judgment by Preston that show failure
to meet his duties to Roller.
additional

documents

is

Immersion in the transcripts and

still

required

to

reach

ultimate

conclusions thereon.
DATED this

H ^

day of December, 1995.

J&FFJgCEVfaY APPEL / '
1995,

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
by Jeffrey W. Appel.

\H

day of December,

(Seal!
Notary Public
WENDY a NATE

J
i

M

NOTARY

: Afr6>>
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.
)
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant,
)
VS.
)
EVAN O. ROLLER,
Defendant and Counterclaimant.
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No. 930000019 CV
JUDGE: BEN H. HADFIELD

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to various motions filed by the parties. The
Court will address them as follows:
I.
This Court entered its partial summary judgment on September 25, 1995. That order
provided in part as follows:
1. "Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant
on all legal malpractice claims asserted in the counterclaim unless the
Defendant on or before October 28, 1995 designates an expert witness or
witnesses who will be prepared to express final opinions with respect to
the legal malpractice claims involved in this case and unless, within said
time, the expert witness or witnesses are made available for their depositions
to be taken by Plaintiff."
On October 24, 1995, the Defendant filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Provide
Expert Witnesses. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum and affidavit and also
included an Ex Parte Order to Extend Time. On October 27, 1995, the Court denied the
Defendant's Ex Parte Order to Extend Time.
Defendant now requests a hearing on the underlying Motion for Extension of Time.
Plaintiff has objected to said hearing. The Court has reviewed the memorandum filed by
both Defendant and Plaintiff. On August 29, 1995, the Court was explicit to the Defendant,
that the deadline set by the Court must be met. The Court finds nothing in the Defendant's
argument which is persuasive that the deadline as set by the Court should be altered in any
manner. The efforts which Defendant claims to have made in procuring the expert witness
are at best weak. Plaintiffs Counsel correctly points out that the Court has already denied
the Ex Parte Order to Extend Time, the deadline has passed, and a hearing on the issue is
now moot. Both sides acknowledge that Defendant did not meet the deadline.
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The Motion to Extend Time is denied and has previously been denied. Defendant has
had (3) three years in which to obtain an expert and failed to do so even during the (60) sixty
day grace period granted by the Court. Therefore, pursuant to the partial summary judgment
entered by this Court on September 25, 1995, all legal malpractice claims asserted in the
counterclaim are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
II.
The Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff. The motion
is, in part, a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Defendant argues that the
summons was not served within the times specified by rules of court and that therefore the
action should be dismissed. Rule 4 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, addresses time
of service and specifies that the summons and complaint shall be served, "no later than 120
days after the filing of the complaint, unless the Court allows a longer period of time for
good cause shown."
It is undisputed that the Court has neither been asked nor allocated a longer period of
time. The file reflects that the complaint was filed May 12, 1992. The summons was issued
October 14, 1992, and served October 21, 1992. There appears to be a period of 161 days
between filing of the complaint and service of the summons and complaint. Therefore, on its
face, it would appear that the service was invalid and that the Plaintiffs complaint should be
dismissed without prejudice.
A difficulty arises in that Defendant has filed a counterclaim herein, thereby seeking
relief from this Court through these proceedings. Defendant finds himself in the
contradictory position of asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction, while simultaneously
requesting this Court to enter a substantial judgment in favor of Defendant and against
Plaintiff on the counterclaim. If jurisdiction does not exist, neither claim could succeed.
The Court has reviewed the counterclaim of the Defendant. The pleading is far from
clear and concise. It appears to the Court that the thrust of the counterclaim is a cause of
action for legal malpractice. Potential other causes of action are hinted, although the
elements of such causes of action are not plainly pled. Pursuant to the Courts' decision
under Section ( I ) herein, all claims of Defendant for legal malpractice are now dismissed.
The Court will allow the Defendant (14) fourteen days in which to file with the Court a
document acknowledging that no other causes of action are stated or asserted through the
counterclaim. If such a document is received from the Defendant, the record will then be
clear that there are no counterclaims pending from Defendant against the Plaintiff. Under
those circumstances, the Court would find no bar to granting the relief requested by
Defendant and pursuant to Rule 4 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiffs
complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.
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III.
The Court recognizes there are other issues and motions pending in this action. In
light of the Courts' rulings in the previous paragraphs, there may no longer be any pending
causes of action in behalf of either Plaintiff or Defendant. For this reason, the Court
reserves ruling on any further motions, pending a determination as to whether Defendant
asserts additional causes of action in his counterclaim.

Counsel for the Plaintiff is requested to prepare an Order in conformance herewith.
DATED this

2 2^

day of November, 1995.
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HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD
EVAN O. KOLLER,
DEFENDANT.

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion For New
Trial, Motion To Reconsider, and Alternate Motion For Rule 54b Certification. The Court
has reviewed the motion together with accompanying memorandum and supporting
documents, the Plaintiffs' opposing memorandum, and the Defendant's reply memorandum.
After considering all of the materials submitted, the Defendant's Motion For New
Trial and Motion To Reconsider are denied. The Court knows of no rule authorizing a
Motion To Reconsider, but has in any event reviewed all of the submitted materials. No
new arguments have been presented, only expanded versions of the previous arguments.
Defendant's counsel seems to believe that the relevant issue is whether Defendant Koller
knew for three years that he must obtain an expert. That inquiry is misdirected. Under the
law, Mr. Koller should have known for the past three years that he must obtain an expert.
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Aside from this, the record is crystal clear that the Court's Order of September 25,
1995 and the Court's pronouncement from the bench on August 29, 1995 required Defendant
to produce his expert for deposition by October 28, 1995. This the Defendant failed to do.
With regards to the Motion For Rule 54b Certificate, it is tie Court's belief that the
September 25, 1995 Order met the requirements of Rule 54b. However, to remove any
question on this issue, the Coun directs Plaintiffs counsel to prepare a proposed Order Of
Dismissal specifically tracking the language of Rule 54b.
The Court has given serious consideration to an award of attorneys fees under Rule
11. However, in view of all of the circumstances, the Court declines to grant Plaintiffs
Motion For Sanctions in this regard. Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order in
conformance herewith.
DATED this J T ^ d a y of February, 1996.
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This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiff's Renewed Motion For Decision
dated December 27, 1995. The Plaintiff is seeking a decision concerning Plaintiff's Motion For
Summary Judgment and Defendant seeks a dismissal.
I.
The Court has reviewed this file including specifically paragraph II of the Memorandum
Decision dated November 22, 1995. The Defendant has failed to file with the Court any type of
document acknowledging that no other causes of action are asserted. The Defendant has, pursuant to
his motion, requested that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4(b) for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts concerning that issue appear uncontested. Service of the Summons and Complaint were not
obtained upon the Defendant with 120 days after filing of the Complaint. However, Defendant's
counterclaim acknowledges and confers jurisdiction, his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Defendant's Motion To Dismiss is therefore denied.
II.
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff's renewed Motion For Decision Concerning Summary
Judgment and has also reviewed the Affidavit supplemental to Plaintiff's Motion For Summary
Judgment, which Affidavit is dated December 27, 1995. The Court has reviewed the Defendant's
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response and also the referenced Affidavit filed by Defendant and dated October 11, 1995. The
Affidavits attempt to provide an exhaustive tracking of the financial dealings of these parties for over
15 years. It appears clear that there are disputed issues of material facts. The Motion For Summary
Judgment is therefore denied.
The Court has reviewed, in detail, the various allegations of the parties as set forth in the
Affidavits. The presentation of evidence on these issues at trial will be both exhaustive and
exhausting. There can be no question but that Plaintiff has expended more than $5,000 in billable
time in pursuing this litigation. There is little possibility that Plaintiff will recover attorneys fees for
this time expended. Taking this matter to trial may double the amount of attorneys time expended by
Plaintiff.
There can likewise be no question but that Defendant has already expended more in legal fees
in this duel than the principal amount originally sought in Plaintiffs' Complaint. It is probable that
these fees will double before the trial is concluded and similarly remote that Defendant will recover
his attorneys fees expended herein.
The parties ought to seriously consider whether it is time for reason to prevail.
DATED this 2 I day of February, 1996.

Ben H. Hadfield
District Judge
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